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ADJUDICATING NON-JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS:
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH
AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Eric C. Christiansen*

We live in a society in which there are great
disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living in
deplorable conditions in great poverty . ... These
conditions already existed when the Constitution was
adopted and a commitment to address them, and
transform our society into one in which there will be
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart
of our new constitutional order. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has historically been argued and traditionally accepted
that socio-economic rights are non-justiciable. Advocates of this
position have asserted that, while rights to housing, health care,
education, and other forms of social welfare may have value as moral

•
Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, San
Francisco, California; J.D., New York University School of Law, 2001; M.A.,
University of Chicago, 1994. In writing this Article I was fortunate to draw upon
my experiences as a 2001 foreign law clerk to Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson of
the South African Constitutional Court. I also benefited from helpful comments
from my GGU colleagues Michele Benedetto, David Oppenheimer, and Rachel
Van Cleave, and received valuable aid from my research assistants, Justin Ngo
and Rory Quintana. Particular gratitude is also due to Chester Chuang for his
insightful critiques and to Andrew Moores-Grimshaw for his enduring support.
The opinions expressed and any errors are my own.
1.
Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA
765 (CC) para. 8 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Soobramoneyl. This and all South African
Constitutional Court cases are available online at the Court's official website,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za.
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statements of a nation's ideals, they should not be viewed as a legal
declaration of enforceable rights. Adjudication of such rights requires
an assessment of fundamental social values that can only be carried
out legitimately by the political branches of government, and the
proper enforcement of socio-economic rights requires significant
government resources that can only be adequately assessed and
balanced by the legislature. Judges and courts, according to this
argument, lack the political legitimacy and institutional competence
to decide such matters.
Nevertheless, a steadily increasing number of countries have
chosen to include socio-economic rights in their constitutions-with
varying (and sometimes unclear) levels of enforcement. 2 At the core
of such "social rights" are rights to adequate housing, health care,
food, water, social security, and education. 3 Each of these rights is
enumerated in the 1996 South African Constitution. 4 Moreover, most
2.
Inclusion of piecemeal social rights, such as the right to education only,
or of comprehensive but non-justiciable rights remains the norm. See Mary Ann
Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 52728 (1992); see also Wojciech Sadurski, Post-Communist Charters of Rights in
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 223 (2002). South
Africa is exceptional for its comprehensive list of enumerated, enforceable social
rights. See Eric C. Christiansen, Survey of Socio-economic Rights in National
Constitutions: Healthcare, Education, Social Security, Housing, Food and Water
(December 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); accord Sandra
Liebenberg, South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights, 6
Law
Democracy
&
Dev.
159
(2002),
available
at
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Projects/Socio-EconomicRightsiresearch/
socio-economic-rights_ jurisprudence/evolvingjurisprudence. pdf.
3.
There is no set list of which rights are properly defined as "socioeconomic" rights. Rather than attempting to create a new orthodoxy regarding
the contents of such a list, I am including those rights in the South African
Constitution that are traditionally and consistently identified as socio-economic
rights by commentators, have been so identified by the South African
Constitutional Court, and have as their evident purpose the improvement of
society through an impact on individuals' social welfare. Similarly, I use the
terms "social" and "socio-economic" to describe the same collection of rights; I
have avoided "red" rights, "second-generation" rights, and "positive" rights
(except when explained in the text) as they are less helpful descriptors for the
same rights.
4.
S. Afr. Const. 1996. For the full text of these rights provisions, see infra
Part II.B.3.b. Other socio-economic rights can be found in the South African
Constitution in ch. 2, §§ 23 (labor relations), 25 (property rights and land reform),
28 (children's rights to, inter alia, "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care
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of them have been the subject of full judicial proceedings before the
South Mrican Constitutional Court. 5 This makes the South Mrican
situation unparalleled in international constitutional jurisprudence.
Although some other countries' constitutions enumerate socioeconomic rights, few countries' courts have found such rights to be
fully and directly justiciable, and even fewer have multiple,
affirmative social rights opinions. No other country has developed
their case law sufficiently to outline a comprehensive jurisprudence.
As a consequence, South Mrica's role in the social rights
adjudication debate is seen as revolutionary and heroic by
proponents of justiciability and as irresponsible and doomed by its
detractors. Now, as the first generation of justices leaves the Court,6
sufficient judgments exist to articulate a novel but coherent
jurisprudence. What is revealed is a Court that has been both less
revolutionary and less irresponsible than commentators expected
(and continue to allege). This is because the Court's jurisprudence
has incorporated the concerns of the jurists who argue that courts
lack the legitimacy and competence to decide such matters, even

services and social services"), and 35 (detainees' rights to, inter alia, "adequate
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment").
5.
The South Mrican judicial system permits constitutional review of social
rights (as with all rights) by lower courts (trial-level High Courts and the
appellate-level Supreme Court of Appeal) as well. As a consequence, social rights
rulings have also been issued by the High Courts (trial courts found in each
province) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (an intermediate appellate court for
constitutional issues and final review court for non-constitutional issues). I am
not considering those judgments, except where noted, because the Constitutional
Court has the capacity to review all such decisions and has altered the lower
courts' orders and presented its own reasoning in each such case. See S. Afr.
Const. 1996; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. Moreover, this paper seeks to
elucidate and evaluate the comprehensive jurisprudence issuing from the Court
rather than to merely poll the various, and sometimes divergent, rulings of all
South African courts. For a review of these lower court judgments related to
socio-economic rights, see the Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community
Law
Centre's
Case
Reviews,
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/
ProjectslSocio-Economic-Rights/case-reviews-1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter SERP's Case Reviewsl.
6.
See Const. Ct. of S. Afr., http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za (official
website) (follow "Judges" hyperlink). Currently five of the eleven justices
appointed in October 1994--Langa, Madala, Mokgoro, O'Regan, and Sachsremain on the court. Newly appointed justices are appointed for non-renewable
terms of 12 to 15 years depending on the age of the Justice at the time of
appointment. S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 8, § 176.
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while the Court is performing the affirmative review and remediation
functions desired by the jurists who favor judicial enforcement of
social rights. The Court maintains an affirmative social rights
jurisprudence tempered by internalized justiciability concerns.
This paper begins with an examination of social rights in the
South Mrican constitutional drafting process. Following a review of
the traditional arguments against the justiciability of socio-economic
rights, it then examines the South African Constitutional Court cases
addressing social rights, focusing on four primary cases: the
antecedent case Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
19967 and three substantive social rights cases, Thiagraj
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,8 Government of
Republic of South Africa v Irene Grootboom and Others,9 and
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) (TAC).IO
This Article then constructs a South African jurisprudence related to
socio-economic rights and highlights its distinctive characteristics.
The final part of this paper demonstrates why the Court's
jurisprudence is best understood as a viable, affirmative
jurisprudence of social rights that is typified by a series of internal,
self-imposed limitations shaped by the theoretical arguments against
the justiciability of such rights.

II. SOCIO-EcONOMIC RIGHTS IN A POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTION
Although the South African constitutional drafting process
involved significant struggle, it ultimately achieved a goal considered
impossible for decades: a relatively non-violent transition from

7.
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras. 119, 76-78 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter In re: Certification of the South African
Constitution l.
8.
Soobramoney, supra note 1.
9.
Government of Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) para. 2 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Grootbooml.
10.
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No.2) 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter TAC]. There were four similarly titled cases in the
South African Constitutional Court because of direct applications and
interlocutory appeals. This citation is to the final judgment.
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"racial autocracy to a non-racial democracy, by means of a negotiated
transition, the progressive implementation of democracy, and respect
for fundamental human rights." 11 Because of unique elements of the
drafting process, the Constitutional Court played a decisive role in
assuring the success of the South African transition to democracy
and in finalizing the Constitutional text. One fundamental
disagreement that arose in the drafting process-a conflict
eventually settled by the Court itself in its Certification opinioninvolved whether or not socio-economic rights were permissibly
included in the Constitution as justiciable rights enforceable by
courts. 12

A.

Drafting a New Constitution for a Democratic South
Africa

In December 1991, delegates of South Africa's various
political parties gathered at Johannesburg's World Trade Centre for
constitutional negotiations at a forum called the Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA).13 Disagreement about the
process for drafting the constitution formed an initial, core conflict
between the dominant negotiating parties preceding any
conversations about particular constitutional provisions. Was the
purpose of CODESA merely to create a workable transition structure
that would facilitate democratic elections and thereby enable a
popularly elected body to draft the Constitution, or were the partyappointed CODESA delegates empowered to write the entire
constitution? This question was about far more than democratic
constitutive theory; the opposing positions represented the

11.
Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 695, 695 (1996); accord African National Congress (ANC),
Mzabalazo: A Brief History of the African National Congress,
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocsiabout/umzabalazo.html (last visited Jan. 13,2007).
12.
In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
paras. 1-19,76-78.
13.
The total work of the CODESA (and its follow-up negotiations, the
Multi-Party Negotiating Process) was carried out by five Working Groups. The
bulk of the Bill of Rights determinations and the procedural details of the
constitutional process-and the vast majority of the most divisive issues-came
out of Working Group Two. Other Groups addressed different aspects of the
transition to democracy. See Lourens du Plessis & Hugh Corder, Understanding
South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 4-6 (1994).
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fundamental strategic goals of the National Party (NP), representing
the white-minority apartheid government, versus the Mrican
National Congress (ANC), the popular and newly unbanned antiapartheid party. The ANC wanted the smallest possible mandate for
CODESA so that the constitution would be drafted by a new, sure-tobe ANC-dominated popular legislature. The NP wanted CODESA to
write an entire constitution that would protect the white minority
through codification of individual and group rights, protection from
prosecution for apartheid-era actions, and clauses preserving the
economic status quo. 14
The solution to this core, procedural conflict was a two-stage
constitutional drafting process with a newly-formed constitutional
court enforcing the parties' negotiated agreement. IS The first stage
involved drafting a preliminary constitution (the 1993 Interim
Constitution), holding fully democratic elections, and setting up a
new Parliament that would choose a new president. The second stage
gave the task of crafting the final constitution (the 1996
Constitution)16 to the newly elected Parliament and Senate in their
role as the Constitutional Assembly. Two safeguards linked the two
stages of the process: a set of thirty-four inviolable constitutional
principles (known as the Thirty-four Principles) established by the
initial negotiating parties to constrict the subsequent, final
constitution l ? and a constitutional court appointed under the Interim
Constitution with the task of certifying that the final Constitution

14.
See generally Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The
Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (1995); Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of
a Miracle (1997) (both books providing general histories of the political
transformation of South Africa at the end ofthe apartheid era).
The basic structure of this plan was originally proposed by Nelson
15.
Mandela one year prior to the start of CODESA, tacitly approved by President de
Klerk at CODESA's inaugural session, and formalized over the course of
CODESA. Waldmeir, supra note 14, at 194-95.
16.
It is, of course, a bit of a misnomer to refer to the 1996 Constitution as
the final constitution. The designation "final" refers not to its projected
permanence but to its place at the end and as capstone of the transition from
apartheid to multi-racial democracy. The Constitution has been amended twelve
times since its completion in December 1996. Amendments are listed and noted
in text on the website for the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm
(last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
17.
S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4.
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did not violate any of the thoroughly negotiated Thirty-four
Principles. IS The Thirty-four Principles guided-or obstructed,
depending on one's perspective-the drafting process for the final
Constitution and the resultant current form of government in South
Africa.
Altogether, nearly two years passed between the start of
formal constitutional negotiations at CODESA and the approval of
the Interim Constitution and the Thirty-four Principles by the party
delegates late in the evening on November 17, 1993. 19 The provisions
of the Interim Constitution, including establishment of the
Constitutional Court, came into effect on the first day of South
Mrica's first multiracial elections, April 26, 1994.20
The Constitutional Assembly, comprised of the 400 newlyelected members of the National Assembly and the ninety members
of the Senate, began working on the text of the final Constitution in
May 1994. Under the Interim Constitution, the constitutive body was
given two years from its first post-election meeting to complete its
task. 21 The text ofthe proposed final Constitution was adopted by an
overwhelming majority in both houses of Parliament-eighty of
ninety Senators and 321 of 400 National Assembly members,
significantly above the required two-thirds majority of the entire 490member body.22 However, the final Constitution could not be signed
by the President or come into force unless and until the

18.
Albie Sachs, South Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution, 41 St. Louis
U. L.J. 1249, 1255 (1997).
19.
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 2-17.
20.
South Africa's democratic elections were held over several days
beginning on April 26, 1994. Despite serious allegations of fraud and ballot
tampering, the results (outside KwaZulu-Natal) conformed with expectations to a
significant degree: the ANC received a strong but not overly dominant 62.7%, the
NP received a disappointing 20.4%, the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party
won the KwaZulu-Natal Province, and the extremist parties on both the left and
right received only marginal percentages. Election '94 South Africa: The
Campaign, Results and Future Prospects 187 (Andrew Reynolds et al. eds., 1994).
21.
S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, ch. 5, § 73.
22.
3 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, Rep. ofS. Afr. 447-50 (1996)
[hereinafter Debates of the Constitutional Assembly]. Only one party, the African
Christian Democratic Party, voted against the text (with two votes). The Freedom
Front, a white right-wing party, abstained from the vote with 13 votes. [d.
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Constitutional Court "certified" it, confirming there were no conflicts
between the Thirty-four Principles and the draft final Constitution. 23
B.

Socio-Economic Rights in the Drafting Process

1.

Socio-Economic Apartheid

Inaugurated in 1948 by the Mrikaner-dominated National
Party, apartheid, or "separateness," developed into a comprehensive
political philosophy and social policy that sought to formally separate
the legally defined races in all areas of social, economic, and political
life. Apartheid expanded upon earlier segregation policies by
criminalizing a wide variety of human activities and denying the
rights and harshly restricting the freedoms of all non-white South
Mricans. As they evolved and expanded throughout the 1960s and
1970s, apartheid laws impacted nearly every aspect of people's lives,
and apartheid definitions of race circumscribed their rights,
opportunities, and relationships with others and the state. Apartheid
dictated a policy of separation with only the merest pretence of
equality, theoretically guided by the development needs of the
"inferior races" but in fact effecting a tremendous socio-economic
advantage for whites, especially Mrikaners. 24 The crushing impact of
apartheid on non-whites had always been experienced in the social
and economic elements of South Africans' lives as well as the
politica1. 25 As Kader Asmal, CODESA negotiator and member of the
Constitutional Assembly for the ANC described it:
The struggle for liberation in South Mrica was not only a
struggle for the right to vote, to move, to marry or to love. It
has always been a struggle for freedom from hunger,
poverty, landlessness, and homelessness. Our Bill of Rights
therefore must reflect . . . the multidimensional and allencompassing nature ofthe struggle for liberation. 26

Although precise information about the South African
economy is either unavailable or unreliable for the waning years of

23.
In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
paras. 1-19, 26-31.
24.
See Frank Welsh, A History of South Africa 414-99 (2000).
25.
See The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspective on South Africa's
Basic Law 408-09 (Penelope Andrews et al. eds., 2001).
26.
3 Debates ofthe Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 122-23.
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apartheid and the subsequent transition to democracy, it was
unquestionably "among the world's most unequal economies.,,27 And,
the inequity closely traced apartheid's racial divide: the standard of
living for whites was nearly on par with residents of Norway or
Sweden while black South Africans had a standard of living below
that of residents of Ghana or Kenya. 28 This desperate socio-economic
situation existed prior to and during the constitutional transition
period and directly impacted the process. 29

2.

Negotiating the Interim Constitution

Because political and socio-economic oppression were
fundamentally intertwined throughout the anti-apartheid struggle,
the ANC's commitment to the transformation of the socio-economic

27.
Julian May, Talking to the Finance Minister about Poverty: Pro-Poor
Policy and the Political Economy of Information 10, paper prepared for the
International Conference on Staying Poor, University of Manchester (April 7-9,
2003), 'available at http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/2003conferencepapersJ
May.pdf (citing the World Bank's description of South Africa's economic
inequality).
28.
Id. at 9 (based on United Nations Development Programme data from
2001). Statistics for all individual aspects of the South African economy track
such discrepancies during the transitional period. While just one percent of
whites fell below the national poverty line, over 60% of blacks did. Id. 65% of
whites had completed secondary education compared to 24% of blacks-and 24%
of blacks had no formal schooling (compared to one percent of whites) at the time
of the transition. A.J. Christopher, Atlas of Changing South Africa 233 (2000).
Although President Thabo Mbeki reported, in his 2006 State of the Nation
address, that there had been a 60% increase in real social expenditure per person
between 1983 and 2003, the stark socio-economic legacy of apartheid will haunt
South Mrica for many decades more. See SouthAfrica.Info, The Poor Must Also
Benefit:
Mbeki
(Feb.
6,
2006),
http://www.southafrica.info/ess_info/
sa~lance/social_delivery/stateofnation2006-social.htm (last visited Jan.
13,
2007).
Significant progress has been made but enormous improvement is still
required to overcome the dramatic inequalities of apartheid. The housing
situation illustrates the continuing challenge: even though 1.46 million
subsidized houses were built in the decade prior to 2004, 36% of households still
do not reside in formal housing. See Gov't Commc'n and Info. Sys., Rep. of S. Afr.,
Toward 10 Years of Freedom: Progress in the First Decade, Challenges in the
Second 2 (2004), available at http://www.gcis.gov.zaldocsJpublicationsJ10tab.pdf
[hereinafter Toward 10 Years of Freedom]. Similar statistics are available for
other socio-economic indicators. [d.
29.
Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 8.
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lives of South Africans can be traced back throughout its history;
socio-economic equality was inextricably linked to political
emancipation in the ANC's vision of a post-apartheid South Mrica. 30
For the National Party, apartheid was a system of socio-economic
benefits (not just political control) and their negotiating position
sought to maintain the beneficial status quo through exclusion of
justiciable socio-economic rights. These strongly opposed viewpoints
regarding one of "the most contentious questions in the South
Mrican constitutional debate" typified the gulf to be bridged in
crafting the post-apartheid constitution. 31
a.

The ANC Position

As a consequence of its history, the inclusion of social and
economic rights in the new constitution was a near-requirement for
the ANC. The party leadership and the general population saw no
separation between the political and the socio-economic restrictions
that were the overwhelmingly harsh reality of apartheid for most
South Mricans. As one ANC leader stated in the debates on the final
1996 Constitution, "Our people did not give their lives in exchange
for the mere freedom to walk the streets ... nor to suffer continued
deprivation while the architects of the old rules live in
spIend or .... "32

These principles took on a new formality and greater
consequence with the drafting of the strongly socialist Freedom
Charter. 33 The Freedom Charter, a statement of political principles
30.
See Kader Asmal, The Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture for 2004 (July
9, 2004), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/2004/sp0709.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2007) (Asmal, a leading ANC figure, discussing the background of the
ANC's struggle against apartheid).
31.
Etiene Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the
Constitution, 8 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 464, 465 (1992).
32.
Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Constitutional Assembly: Annual
Report 1996 (1996), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/
constitutionlca/ANREPORT/Ca95_96.pdf (quoting Kader Asmal from open debate
in Constitutional Assembly).
33.
Freedom Charter, Congress of the People, June 26, 1955, African
National Congress Historical Document Archive, http://www.anc.org.za/
ancdocs/history/charter.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Freedom
Charter]. It is controversial to describe the Freedom Charter as strongly socialist.
Although the Charter declared that the "national wealth of our country ... shall
be restored to the people; [t]he mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and
monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole;
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by South Mricans opposed to apartheid, was popularly ratified at the
Congress of the People in Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on June 26,
1955. 34 The Freedom Charter called for a multiracial, democratically
elected government in South Mrica with equal opportunities for all.
On socio-economic topics, the Freedom Charter declared:
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal
for all children ....
All people shall have the right to ... be decently housed,
and to bring up their families in comfort and security . . .
[Nlo-one shall go hungry; [andl Free medical care and
hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care
for mothers and young children .... 35

Though not a formal ANC document, the Freedom Charter
represented the guiding philosophical expression of the antiapartheid movement generally, and the ANC specifically, over the
ensuing decades. It was the precursor to some of the ANC's most
important constitutional documents: the 1988 Constitutional
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa;36 Ready to Govern In
1992;37 and the draft Bills of Rights produced beginning in 1990.38

[andl [alll other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of
the people," its socialist tendencies have, at various times or for different
audiences, been exaggerated or downplayed.
34.
The Congress of the People was composed of members of various antiapartheid groups including the African National Congress, the South African
Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats, and the Coloured
People's Congress. The Freedom Charter was later adopted independently by all
four organizations. [d.
35.
Freedom Charter, supra note 33; see also ANC, Africans' Claims in
South Mrica, Bill of Rights (1943), available at http://www.anc.org.za/
ancdocslhistory/claims.html (strongly urging "the establishment of free medical
and health services for all sections of the population" and demanding
"[rlecognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the home as the right of every
family ... [andl the right of every child to free and compulsory education").
ANC, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa (1988),
36.
reprinted in 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 235 (1989) [hereinafter Constitutional
Guidelines].
37.
ANC, Ready to Govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South
Africa adopted at the National Conference (1992), available at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html
[hereinafter
Ready
to
Governl.
38.

ANC, Building a United Nation: ANC Policy Proposals for Final
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The Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa
were drafted by the ANC Constitutional Committee and made public
as the possibility of a negotiated end to apartheid, with an unbanned
ANC playing a major role, began to seem promising. It was a pithy
working document of ANC constitutional policy that directly
referenced the Freedom Charter: "The Constitution shall include a
Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter .... The state and all
social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to take active
steps to eradicate, speedily, the economic and social inequalities
produced by racial discrimination."39
In 1992, the ANC produced Ready to Govern, which
expounded their guidelines for the constitution to be drafted at
CODESA. 40 Where the Constitutional Guidelines affirmed the ANC's
commitment to the values of the Freedom Charter, Ready to Govern
demonstrated a more mature application of those values to the larger
project of constitution-making within the South African context. The
more developed and sophisticated policies of Ready to Govern grew
out of the years of intense domestic debate generally, and significant
internal ANC discussions specifically. Ready to Govern identifies the
ANC's clear intention to include affirmative provisions related to
socio-economic rights:
The Bill of Rights will affirm the right of all persons to
have access to basic educational, health and welfare
services. It will establish principles and mechanisms to
ensure that there is an enforceable and expanding
minimum floor of entitlements for all, in the areas of
education, health and
welfare. It will commit the courts to take into account the
need to reduce malnutrition, unemployment and
homelessness when making any decisions ....
Special agencies linked to Parliament and the courts
should be set up so as to ensure that national, regional and
local authorities apply appropriate shares of their budgets
to achieving these rights, taking into account the problems
oflimited resources and affordability.41

Constitution
(1995),
available
at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/
building.html [hereinafter Building a United Nation).
39.
Constitutional Guidelines, supra note 36, at 237.
40.
Ready to Govern, supra note 37.
41.
Id.
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The subsequently proposed draft Bills of Rights adhered to these
principles and were advanced by the ANC's negotiators for inclusion
in the Interim Constitution.
b.

The National Party / Government Position

For the ruling National Party, the traditional arguments
against the justiciability of socio-economic rights and realpolitik
arguments about the South African economy formed the core of their
opposition to the inclusion of socio-economic rights. Claiming to
represent economic realism in the face of populist pressures, the NP
leader Frederik Willem de Klerk argued "only if economic security
can be maintained together with political security will we have the
stability which is necessary to build a new South Africa. »42 But
behind such assertions, what the NP truly feared was a dramatic
change in the economic status quO. 43 Even more dramatically than it
harmed all non-white South Africans, the system of apartheid had
preserved socio-economic privilege for white South Africans,
especially Afrikaners. 44 Rights that might alter the distribution of
domestic wealth were a direct threat.
The NP's constitutional policies, expressed in its Proposals
for a Charter of Fundamental Rights, advanced traditional
libertarian doctrine in allowing only negative enforcement of rights
against the state. 45 As proposed by the NP, the Constitution would
only allow claims to restrict government action, and only when such
action interfered with the rights of individuals. The Bill of Rights
would not recognize any affirmative claims upon the state to care for
its citizens or to provide social welfare benefits. The NP Bill of Rights
would have precluded any significant challenges to the status quo
and was thus in direct opposition to the transformational social
philosophy of the ANC. Indeed, the NP proposals even conflicted with
the quasi-governmental South African Law Commission, which

42.
Robert Henderson, De Klerk and "Law and Order" in South Africa,
Commentary No. 5 (Aug. 1990) (an unclassified publication of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service), available at http;llwww.csis-scrs.gc.caleni
publications/commentary/com05.asp.
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32.
43.
44.
Welsh, supra note 24, at 463-99.
45.
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32-33. It is, of course, a great
irony that the most heavily interventionist of governments had an eleventh-hour
conversion to "hands-off' government (on the eve of its loss of power).
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proposed an approach to social rights based on "directive
principles.'>46 But even "directive principles," constitutional
statements about budgeting priorities that are legally
unenforceable,47 went too far for the NP. Ultimately, the only social
right the NP proposed in its draft Bill of Rights was a qualified right
to primary education-and this was motivated by the NP's insistence
on Mrikaans-based education rather than by concern for substantive
equality.48 If the NP had prevailed, the socio-economic legacy of
apartheid would not have been addressed by the Constitution.
Further, if the newly democratic government had attempted to
remedy the economic legacy of apartheid, the Bill of Rights would
have actually protected individuals against such government action.
c.

Interim Constitution

The Interim Constitution was initially intended to be a mere
framework document, sufficient for the period leading up to South
Mrica's first democratic elections and for governing the country
during the drafting of the final Constitution, but otherwise limited. 49
An expansive list of civil and political rights but few social rights
were included in the Interim Constitution. 50 Furthermore, social
rights were not expressly mentioned in the Thirty-four Principles
that would guide the drafting of the final Constitution. 51 The Interim

46.
Id. at 26-29.
47.
See, e.g., India Const. arts. 36-51 ["Directive Principles of State Policy"]
(Article 37 states: "The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable
by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply
these principles in making laws."); Ir. Const., 1937, art. 45 ["Directive Principles
of Social Policy"] ("The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are
intended for the general guidance of the Oireachtas [Irish legislature]. The
application of those principles in the making of laws shall be the care of the
Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be cognisable by any Court under any of the
provisions of this Constitution."); and Namib. Const. arts. 95-101 ["Principles of
State Policy"] (Article 101: "The principles of state policy contained in this
Chapter shall not of and by themselves be legally enforceable by any Court, but
shall nevertheless guide the Government in making and applying laws to give
effect to the fundamental objectives ofthe said principles.")
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 32-33.
48.
49.
S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993.
50.
Id. ch. 3.
51.
Id. sched. 4.
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Constitution guaranteed only the right to basic education52 and, for
children, the rights to "security, basic nutrition and basic health and
social services.,,53 It also stated that the "right freely to engage in
economic activity and to pursue a livelihood" did not "preclude
measures designed to promote the protection or the improvement of
the quality of life ... human development [and] social justice.,,54 In
addition, the Interim Constitution required basic nutrition and
medical care for prisoners. 55
In part, this dearth of social rights is attributable to the
strength of the NP's negotiating position in the initial stage of the
constitutional drafting process. Also, as the negotiating parties
neared the end of the period for completing the Interim Constitution,
final settlement of several issues was simply postponed in order to
get the document finished and to hold the long-delayed democratic
elections. 56 Moreover, in order to speed its implementation, the ANC
sacrificed some of the party's goals for the Interim Constitution. 57 As
a result, the divisive issue of socio-economic rights remained
unsettled when the Constitutional Assembly gathered to draft the
final Constitution.

Id. § 30(a).
Id. § 30(c).
54.
Id. § 26.
55.
Id. § 25(b).
56.
1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 80-81
(statement of Abdul Asmal, Member, ANC) ("[T]he controversial issues which we
skirted ... have to be looked at here ... because we have to look at the issues
that were not fully dealt with ... [including] economic and social rights, because
we cannot make promises of liberal and democratic rights without a full
familiarity with economic and social rights ....").
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, ch. 1; see also Hassen Ebrahim,
57.
Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa 165-72 (Oxford University
Press 1998). Other niceties were sacrificed in finalizing the Interim Constitution,
a document described by one drafter as "sloppy, untidy, unstructured, obscure in
many places and without ... stylistic coherence .... [I]t is like South Africa ...
large, unwieldy and uncontrollable . . . ." 1 Debates of the Constitutional
Assembly, supra note 22, at 78 (statement of Abdul Asmal, Member, ANC).
52.
53.
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Socio-Economic Rights in the Interim
Constitutional Period
a.

Socio-Economic Rights and the
Constitutional Assembly

Political circumstances were very different during the
drafting period for the final Constitution. The ANC was no longer
just one of nineteen negotiating parties 58 or an inexperienced,
recently-legalized political party. Following the elections, it became
South Africa's dominant political force. The ANC received 62.7% of
the popular vote in the first multiracial elections and Nelson
Mandela was elected the President of the Republic of South Africa. 59
As a result of their sweeping electoral victory-the next most popular
party in the elections (the NP) received only one-third as many
votes-the ANC provided 312 members of the 490-member
Constitutional Assembly that was to draft the final Constitution.
Also, the ANC's primary negotiator of the provisions of the Interim
Constitution, Cyril Ramaphosa, became Chairperson of the
Constitutional Assembly, further strengthening the ANC's position. 60
In the debates, the party representatives addressed a variety
of contentious issues, including the expansion and enforceability of
socio-economic rights in the final Constitution.
Inclusion of social rights was expressly supported in floor
debates by representatives of the ANC and the Pan African
Congress, which together represented 317 out of 490 members in the
Constitutional Assembly.61 However, much of the debate over

58.
Du Plessis & Corder, supra note 13, at 4.
59.
Election '94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects
183 (Andrew Reynolds et al. eds., 1994).
60.
Const. Assembl., Annual Report May 1994-May 1995, at 3 (1995),
available at http://www.polity.org.zaihtmVgovdocs/constitution/calANREPORT/
Ca94_95.pdf. General debates were held for the Constitutional Assembly as a
whole but much of the detailed drafting was carried out by the nine Theme
Committees, aided by ad hoc Technical Committees and led and managed by the
Constitutional Committee. Id.
61.
Id. The individual members and their party affiliation are identified at
the opening of each Constitutional Assembly session. Debates of the
Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at vi-xi.
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inclusion of social rights did not make it to the formal floor debates of
the entire assembly.
From the first session of the Assembly, the ANC signaled its
commitment to socio-economic rights. In Cyril Ramaphosa's first
address as Chairperson of the Assembly, he asserted that "the
Constitution we draft must reinforce the aspirations of all our
people" on socio-economic development matters.62 This statement
reflected the culmination of ANC thought on the importance of the
Bill of Rights generally and on the inclusion of social rights
specifically. As expressed in the ANC's proposals for the final
Constitution, entitled Building a United Nation: ANC Policy
Proposals for the Final Constitution:
The Bill of Rights shall affirm the right of all persons to
have access to basic educational, health and welfare
services. It will establish principles and mechanisms to
ensure that there is an enforceable and expanding
minimum floor of entitlements for all, in the areas of
education, health and welfare. It shall commit the courts to
take into account the need to reduce malnutrition,
unemployment and homelessness when making any
decisions. 63

In light of the novel nature of their potential inclusion, however,
justiciable social rights were by no means a primary focus of
discussion. ANC speakers merely affirmed their support for inclusion
and briefly addressed the arguments against such rights, generally
confident that opposition to their inclusion would be insufficient. 64

62.
1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 7.
63.
Building a United Nation, supra note 38.
64.
1 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 136-37
(statement of Brigitte Mabandla, Member, ANC) (reviewing arguments against
inclusion during the drafting of the Interim Constitution); Id. at 152 (statement
of Patricia De Lille, Member, Pan African Congress) (calling for greater social
rights than are found in the Interim Constitution); Id. vol. 2, at 9 (statement of
Thabo Mbeki, Member and future national President, ANC) (calling the inclusion
of social rights "essential" on first day of open debate); Id. at 29 (statement of
Richard Sizani, Member, Pan African Congress) (supporting a Bill of Rights that
allows the state "to provide for the well-being of all members of our society ... ");
Id. at 36 (statement of Kader Asmal, Member, ANC) (saying that the
Constitution "must guarantee the twin goals of a better life for all-because the
right to life is meaningless without the right to a better life-and a dramatically
transformed life for the poor.") (emphases added).
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Nevertheless, some opposition was expressed in formal
debates, most often and forcefully by the NP: "[S]o-called second
generation rights-for example, rights to social benefits . . . should
not be entrenched as rights against the State. The State could simply
not afford the cost of them."65 Additionally, some of the comments of
assembly members, although not concerning social rights specifically,
may have been targeted at the feared economic consequences of
making such rights justiciable by courtS. 66 The cost of such rights
would threaten the economic viability of the state. With
unacknowledged irony, the NP also claimed to oppose such rights
because they could harm South Africa's "fragile" human rights
culture that was "but 9 months old"--overlooking that the NP's own
grossly unjust policies had given rise to that situation. 67 The NP's
proposed compromise on this issue was to implement constitutional
provisions that were merely socio-economic "directive principles" for
the national and provincial. governments (following the model of
India68 ) rather than enforceable rights, but this idea received little
support in the Constitutional Assembly.69
The Democratic Party stressed feasibility arguments in
opposing inclusion of constitutional rights, stressing that legislative
programs could provide "a better and more worthwhile life for all
South Africans. "70 The Democratic Party also argued that a
constitution could not endure over multiple generations if social
rights were included, since such rights necessarily change over time.
If such rights were fulfilled, they would no longer need to be included
and if they were not fulfilled, they would become mere "paper
promises," weakening the legitimacy ofthe Constitution itselC'

65.
2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 53
(statement of Ray Radue, Member, National Party).
66.
[d. at 53.
67.
[d.
68.
See India Const. arts. 36-51 (containing the Directive Principles of
State Policy).
69.
2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 53
(statement of Ray Radue, Member, National Party, Senate).
70.
[d. at 67 (statement of Anthony Leon, Member, Democratic Party,
National Assembly) ("No constitution, however good it is, however we embolden it
and however permissive it is, can actually deliver a better life for South
Africans. ").
71.
[d. at 68 (Anthony Leon, Member, Democratic Party).
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The ANC and other proponents of inclusion of enforceable
social rights were supported by the Constitutional Assembly's Public
Participation Programme, an ambitious (and, by most standards,
rather successful) public education and popular involvement
program.72 The Public Participation Programme gathered more than
two million submissions from citizens and domestic groups. These
comments were transcribed, translated, and submitted to the
relevant committees of the Constitutional Assembly for their
consideration. Theme Committee Four, which reviewed Fundamental
Rights as part of the drafting process, received numerous petitions
and individual comments on social rights-related issues during its
discussion of the final Constitution's Bill of Rights. 73 According to the
Constitutional Assembly, "jobs, houses, the need to end crime and
violence and better education" were the main issue of concern to
South Africans. 74
In the end, opposition arguments based on economics,
feasibility, or the possibility of changing values were not enough to
threaten the dominant desire to "give real hope in legal form to those
without hope. "75 Furthermore, as the two-year drafting period drew
to an end, the debates of the full Constitutional Assembly narrowly
focused on a limited set of more sharply divisive issues: minority
education, provincial power, labor issues, and co-governance. 76
Inclusion of social rights seems to have been recognized as a foregone

72.
Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Public Participation Programme,
http://web.archive.org/web/19991003165531/http://www.constitution.org.zalfct221
15.html#PART (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (recognizing the "fundamental
significance of a Constitution in the lives of citizens" and thus seeking to place
public participation "at the centre of the Constitution-making process."); see also
Ebrahim, supra note 57, at 239-50 (detailing the successes of the Public
Participation Programme in engaging the public). Additional popular support for
social rights was expressed at public hearings, through petitions, and via other
informal processes. See Sandra Liebenberg, The Interpretation of Socia-Economic
Rights, in 2 Constitutional Law of South Africa § 33.2(a), n.3 (Matthew
Chaskalson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
73.
Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.2(a), n.3.
Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Constitutional Assembly: Annual
74.
Report 1996, at 78 (1996), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/
govdocs/constitutionlca/ANREPORT/Ca95_96.pdf (summarizing reports of an
opinion poll about constitutional issues).
75.
2 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22, at 36 (ANC
member Kader Asmal).
Ebrahim, supra note 57, at 200-08.
76.
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conclusion in this later, more democratic stage of the constitutional
drafting process since it had such significant support by South
Africa's general population and its largest political party.
b.

Final Constitution

The ANC's long-standing support of a rights-based society
and the popular need to address the socio-economic legacy of
apartheid ultimately yielded a draft final Constitution inclusive of
express constitutional rights to housing, food, water, social security,
children's welfare, health care, and education, among other social
rights. The relevant constitutional provisions are:
26 Housing
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right. 77
27 Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to(a) health care services, including reproductive health
care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to
support themselves and their dependants,
appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical
treatment. 78
28 Children
(1) Every child has the right-

77.
78.

s. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 26.
[d. § 27.
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(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care
services and social services . . .79
29 Education
(1) Everyone has the right(a) to a basic education, including adult basic
education; and
(b) to further education, which the state, through
reasonable measures, must make progressively
available and accessible. 80
It is important to note that the structure of the foregoing
social rights provisions is different from traditional civil and political
rights clauses. Almost all of the social rights sections have text that
identifies judicially cognizable limitations on the scope of the right.
For example, with respect to housing and health care, the state's
positive obligations listed in subsection (1) are qualified by the
language in subsection (2) about "available resources" and
"progressive realization." These clauses temper the affirmative
obligations of the state and add a level of required analysis for the
reviewing court. These limitations are modeled after the language of
the United Nations' International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights 81 and are referred to as "internal limitations clauses"
to distinguish them from the Section 36 general limitations clause in
the Constitution. 82

79.
80.

[d. § 28.
[d. § 29.

81.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures."). See discussion infra Part IILA.1.
82.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36:
Limitation of rights
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors, including(a) the nature of the right;
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Even though the Constitutional Assembly agreed on these
socio-economic rights provisions, the Constitutional Court still
needed to certifY the provisions (in conjunction with the entire text of
the proposed final Constitution) before they could come into force. In
order to determine if the social rights provisions were compatible
with the mandatory Thirty-four Principles of the negotiated Interim
Constitution, the Court was required to evaluate, among other
things, whether or not the proposed rights met the Interim
Constitution's requirement ofjusticiability. Hence, the Constitutional
Court had ultimate authority, exercised in its 1996 In re:
Certification of the South African Constitution opinion, to decide
whether or not the South Mrican Constitution would include socioeconomic rights.
III. OVERVIEW OF NON-JUSTICIABILITY ARGUMENTS

When the abstract question of the justiciability of social
rights reached the Constitutional Court in July 1996, the issue had
already been widely debated. Any court would have been aware of
the traditional consensus that social rights were not justiciable. This
was especially true of the newly appointed justices of the South
Mrican Constitutional Court, in light of their international

(b) the importance ofthe purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its
purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
Like many constitutions, but notably not the United States Constitution, the
South African Constitution has a general limitations clause that identifies
criteria for examining whether a particular violation of an enumerated right is
nevertheless acceptable under other, broader constitutional principles.
The relationship between the internal and the general limitations clause is an
unsettled area of the Court's jurisprudence. See Johan de Waal, lain Currie &
Gerhard Erasmus, The Bill of Rights Handbook 451 (4th ed. 2001); Liebenberg,
supra note 72, § 33.10; Kevin Iles, Limiting SoCio·Economic Rights: Beyond the
Internal Limitations Clause, 20 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 448 (2004); see also Jafiha
v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras. 31-33 (S. Afr.).
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experience and broad exposure to human rights jurisprudence. 83
Additionally, the text of both the then-effective Interim Constitution
and the proposed final Constitution required consideration of
international law and encouraged review of comparable foreign law
precedents. 84 For these reasons, it is helpful to review the relevant
arguments against justiciability prior to discussing the South Mrican
Court's abstract approval of social rights in the In re: Certification of
the South African Constitution opinion in order to better understand
the milieu of its initial social rights jurisprudence.

A.

Non-Justiciability Arguments

The arguments typically marshaled in opposition to judicial
enforcement of socio-economic rights are manifold and confusing. In
the most simplistic presentation of these arguments, the special
nature of socio-economic rights and the institutional limitations of
courts make adjudication of these rights impossible. To provide an
overview of these arguments, this Article focuses first on the
difficulties arising from the supposed differences between negative
political rights and positive social rights. Many of the alleged
distinctions between these two types of rights are historical and
descriptive rather than inherent and normative. Second, this Article
examines viewpoints opposing adjudication of such rights, that is,
arguments about the legitimate and competent enforcement of social
rights by judges and courts.
It is not the purpose of this Article to comprehensively
challenge the customary arguments against the adjudication of social
rights. Rather, it is necessary to identify those arguments which
would have been most pressing on the minds of the South Mrican
Constitutional Court justices as they formulated their social rights
jurisprudence. As will be shown, the arguments that were viewed as
legitimate-even though not insurmountable-concerns by the Court
are a much smaller subset of the larger population of abstract non-

83.
Many of the justices, especially the ANC members, had joined foreign
law faculties, human rights organizations, and NGOs, or had participated in
meetings or international conferences related to apartheid and human rights. See
Const. Ct. of S. Afr., http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za (last visited Jan. 13,
2007) (follow "Judges" hyperlink) (providing biographies of current and former
justices).
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 39; S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, ch. 3, § 35.
84.
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justiciability arguments. It is those "surviving" justiciability concerns
that will be shown to have shaped the contours of the Court.
1.

Fundamentally Different Fundamental Rights

The tension between civil and political rights and social and
economic rights has a long history-a history that more often
burdens rather than aids an understanding of their genuine
differences. These differences were presumptively evidenced by the
twentieth-century division of the rights in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (VDHR)85 into two distinct binding Covenants 86the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR)87
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).88
This division is certainly neither an originally-intended nor a
necessary separation. The post-war UDHR envisions and expressly
identifies the inherent and necessary interrelationship of the two
types ofrights. 89 But in the years following the drafting ofthe UDHR,
global politics (most importantly the rise of Cold War tensions) and
the formation of the first-generation factions in the United Nations
led to a division of the rights promoted in the UDHR into the two
distinct Covenants. 90 Nevertheless, the indivisibility of social and
political rights has been repeatedly affirmed by the international
community. The 1993 Vienna Declaration reasserts the international
law consensus:

85.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess. U.N. Doc. N810 (1948) (hereinafter UDHR).
Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in
86.
Context: Law Politics Morals 245-48 (2d ed. 2000).
87.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR). The ICCPR was signed by South Africa
on October 3, 1994 and ratified on December 10, 1998.
ICESCR, supra note 81. The ICESCR was signed by South Africa on
88.
October 3, 1994 and has not been ratified as of January 2007. The first few years
of democracy in South Africa saw a flurry of treaty acceptance and ratification
since the apartheid government had been a pariah state, but the pace has
slackened in later years.
89.
[d. South Africa, along with Saudi Arabia and the nations of the Soviet
bloc, abstained from the vote on the UDHR at the time of its adoption.
90.
Steiner & Alston, supra note 77, at 238; William Felice, The Global
New Deal: Economic and Social Human Rights in World Politics 7-8 (2003).
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All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same
emphasis .... [Ilt is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 91

Although the initial distinction between ICCPR rights, socalled "negative rights," and ICESCR rights, "positive rights," grew
out of post-war political tensions, in more recent decades the division
has been presumed to reflect fundamental differences in the nature
of the rights themselves. Traditional political rights such as freedom
of expression, equal protection, and due process are considered
negative rights because they only require that the state refrain from
interfering in the individual's exercise of the right; they are rights to
be free from government interference. Socio-economic rights are
identified as positive rights because they impose affirmative
obligations upon the state to advance particular areas of social
welfare. Under the dominant thinking that supports and encourages
this separation, negative rights are justiciable because they involve
discrete cases, they examine precise rights, and their remedies
implicate only a cessation of action by government beyond the scope
of judicial authority. Positive rights are merely (and necessarily)
hortatory because they are vaguely worded, involve more complex
issues, and would assign unacceptable positive obligations to
government.
Because the manner in which most academics and
practitioners discuss rights and rights adjudication has been
fundamentally shaped by systems in which only traditional civil and
political rights have been justiciable, it becomes difficult to
distinguish between inherent characteristics of social rights and
their socially-constructed limitations. In classic arguments against
the justiciability of social rights, these distinctions, often presented
as a set of inviolable maxims, are coupled with arguments about the
political legitimacy and institutional competence of courts in order to
reject judicial enforcement of social welfare rights.92 For these
91.
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25,1993, U.N. Doc.
NCONF. 157/23, 1993, art. 5.
92.
See Steiner & Alston, supra note 86, at 237-320; Philip Alston,
Economic and Social Rights, in Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century
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reasons, discussions about the justiciability of social rights are
inherently difficult. 93
Increasingly, academics and commentators have recognized
the invalidity of this positive-negative distinction. 94 A typical
negative right (e.g., freedom of expression) is equally imprecise and
gives rise to a comparable need for interpretation (e.g., what limits
exist, is there differential treatment for political, commercial,
religious, hate-based or pornographic speech, what is the
interrelationship with other political rights, etc.) as much as a typical
positive right (e.g., right to education). Paradoxically, the argument
that social rights are less precise than political rights may primarily
rest on their extremely limited history of adjudication.
Similarly, political rights can require assessment of
significant factual or social phenomena. Consider, for example, the
information reviewed to make a decision about the validity of voting
procedures or disparate impact discrimination claims. And, even
negative rights impose substantial affirmative obligations on states.
After all, a voting rights decision can require expensive new
procedures or materials or may vastly increase voter rolls, placing a
huge financial burden on the state.

137 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Dennis Davis, The
Case against Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands. in a Bill of Rights except as
Directive Principles, 8 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 475 (1992); Jackbeth K.
Mapulanga-Hulston, Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 6 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 29 (2002).
This paper is not specifically concerned with general critiques of the
93.
incorporation of social rights into constitutional texts nor with challenges to the
value of written Bills of Rights generally-both of which are frequently conflated
with critiques of social rights justiciability. The starting point for this inquiry is a
country that includes social rights in its written constitution. There are
arguments against judicial review of social rights that are distinct from (or more
compelling than) traditional majoritarian arguments against judicial review and
I will reference those to the extent the South African situation reveals something
about them, but I will avoid the well-trod territory of judicial review apologetics.
94.
See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 263
(1998); Stephen Holmes & Cass Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty
Depends on Taxes (1999); Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: Roosevelt's
Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It Now More than Ever (2005); see also
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 48-71 (1992) (rejecting the negative-positive distinction because the
general notion of rights connotes positive and negative duties equally).
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In these ways, an a priori distinction between negative and
positive rights is inconsistent with a genuine understanding of the
rights. This is not to assert that there are no differences between
political and social rights. Indeed there are; even at an abstract level,
social rights are more frequently related to social policy, a more
volatile area of government policy for most nations. In theory, the
social rights remedies imposed by a court could be overwhelming to a
state, such as if a court were to require the government to provide
universal employment, universal education through to the university
level, free unlimited health care, etc. But this is the enforcement
issue, not the justiciability issue. The nature of the rights themselves
is not a legitimate basis for rejecting their justiciability. The South
Mrican Court has recognized this as well. 95 A valid rejection of social
rights justiciability must rely on their inability to be properly or
effectively adjudicated. Hence, the real area of concern is not the
nature of the rights but what some commentators fear judges and
courts will do with such rights.
2.

Justiciability: The Legitimacy and Competence of
Courts

An additional series of contemporary arguments against the
justiciability of social rights can loosely be divided into concerns
about political legitimacy and concerns about institutional
competence. 96 These critiques are about judicial review per se rather
than about socio-economic rights per se, as discussed in the previous
section.

a.

Legitimacy: Overreaching Courts?

Legitimacy arguments focus on the inappropriateness of
assigning the task of interpreting social values to an unelected
judiciary, and, most critically, of allowing judicial interference in the

95.
In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
paras. 78-79.
96.
The division presented here is reconfigured from several different
schemes for classifying non-justiciability arguments. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note
94, at 263; see also Mureinik, supra note 31, at 464; see also Davis, supra note 92,
at 475 (all providing a helpful analysis of the variety of non-justiciability
arguments).

348

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW

[38:321

allocation of state monies-a core legislative task. The primary
concern is that crafting and assigning a remedy in a social rights case
is too similar to the legislature's traditional role of deciding policy
and creating and implementing programs. To view such rights as
justiciable would necessarily and impermissibly intrude on the
province of the legislative branch-most glaringly when a court
overrides a legislative act regarding social welfare and asserts a
different course of action for the state.
It may be that this argument would carry more weight in
countries that have not expressly allocated such authority to the
judiciary or where such rights are not enumerated in the nation's
constitution; that is not the case in South Africa. Most legitimacy
critiques are considerably less persuasive in the South Mrican
context because the Court is interpreting enumerated social rights in
accordance with its broad institutional mandate from the
Constitution. 97 The Constitutional Assembly explicitly assigned the
task of interpreting social rights to the judiciary in the South African
Constitution. Moreover, neither the Constitutional text nor the
discussion of the Constitutional Assembly reveals or implies that
social rights were to be enforced or interpreted in a manner different
from the standard of traditional political rights. 98 The text of the
social rights provisions echoes the language of political rights
provisions and is placed in the Bill of Rights without distinction
based on the kind of rights. Indeed, Section 7(2) requires the state to
"respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. "99

Legitimacy concerns may also reflect a broad-based distrust
of judicial review more than a specific concern about social rights
adjudication. This distrust is not reflected in the South Mrican
Constitution's division of authority among branches of government.
Indeed, this viewpoint overlooks the fact that while the Constitution
includes the principle of separation of powers, the South African
. Constitutional Court is first among equals. The Constitutional Court

97.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 8 (Application) and 39 (Interpretation of
the Bill of Rights); see also infra Part IV.A.
98.
The obvious exception here is the internal limitation clause ("within
available resources" and "progressive realization"), which is a limitation in the
text of the right itself rather than a limitation on the judicial role. See S. Afr.
Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36(2).
99.
[d. § 7(2).

2007]

ADJUDICATING NON-JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS

349

was given powers in the transition to democracy and still retains
powers which evidence its role as a uniquely powerful institution-in
contrast with other Constitutional courts and in comparison with
other South African government entities. 10o In South Africa, the
Constitution marked an explicitly moral break from the past and
reflected a fundamental choice to form a state with certain social
values-including social justice as a means of advancing substantive
equality. The Court bears a more significant proportion of the
responsibility for policing the newly-entrenched moral precommitments of the constitutional generation; such a distribution of
power weakens the claims of judicial illegitimacy in this area. Given
the Constitutional Court's unique mandate and express powers,
legitimacy arguments are not a significant challenge to social rights
justiciability in the South African context.
b.

Competency: Appropriately Skilled Courts?

Institutional competence arguments focus on procedural
limitations, a court's capacity to attain and assess extensive
information, and problematic aspects of a court's potential remedies.
These arguments tend to be interrelated and reinforcing. Specifically,
the concerns are whether a court or judge has the institutional
capability to appropriately adjudicate social rights when confronted
with a single complainant or group (the "plaintiff problem"); to access
and review all necessary specialized information (the "information
problem"); and to adequately remedy any violation of the right in
view of the limited scope of the problem before the court---especially
when contrasted with the required universality of the solution (the
"remedy problem").
According to these critiques, courts typically review specific
controversies concerning individual claimants, a procedure that is
inappropriate for social rights adjudication because limited
deliberation and focused remedies cannot easily account for all
similarly situated individuals. The deciding judge is exposed to a
single snapshot (e.g., a particular homeless individual as a plaintiff)
of the larger issue (inadequate housing) and has only the information
presented by the parties upon which to adjudicate. This not only

100. [d. ch. 2, §§ 38 (Enforcement of Rights) and 39 (Interpretation of Bill of
Rights), and ch. 8, §§ 165 (Judicial Authority) and 167 (Constitutional Court).
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compromises the interpretation of the right but it reveals a further
reason that this work is inappropriate for judges. An individual
common law judge cannot possibly accrue the kind of institutional
sophistication to make decisions of the scale required by social rights
adjudication since she does not have access to the necessary
information resources. Nor can a typical common law judge order (or
fund) relevant factual inquiries as a legislature or the executive
could. Presumably, either a court will provide a narrow,
individualized remedy for the present party only, ignoring the host of
absent but similarly situated persons, or it will evaluate all claims
based on the limited (and possibly idiosyncratic) information from a
single plaintiff.
c.

The Plaintiff, Information, and Remedy
Problems

Dividing the more general competency-based critiques of
social rights adjudication into discrete components-the plaintiff,
information, and remedy problems-allows a more thorough analysis
of the arguments. IOI More importantly, it allows one to identifY those
elements of the competency critique that are relevant in the South
Mrican context-and would therefore need to be addressed by the
Constitutional Court as it crafts a social rights jurisprudence.
The plaintiff problem is partially addressed by the broad
access provisions of the South Mrican Constitution. Generally
speaking, the jurisdiction of the Court is very broad and access to the
Court is permissive, allowing discretionary access on appeal,
required review for lower court judgments declaring a law
unconstitutional, discretionary direct access to the Court, and even
abstract review of laws prior to implementation by Parliament. 102
Individuals, classes of complainants, associations, and "anyone acting

101.
This division of issues is loosely based on a general discussion of the
functional differences between legislatures and courts in David Shapiro, Courts,
Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 551-55 (1988).
S. Mr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 167; see Eric C. Christiansen, Essay: An
102.
Appropriately Activist Court: South African Constitutional Court Rights
Jurisprudence, 1995-2001, at Part II (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author) (discussing the procedural authority of the Court and its effect on the
Court's influence).
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in the public interest" can bring a claim before the Court.I03 This
lessens the potential severity of the problem because the
Constitution allows all those concerned to join in the claim before the
Court. But these broad access provisions only address part of the
plaintiff problem because nothing compels all concerned parties, or
organizations representing their interests, to join in a pending action.
Valid concerns exist that an individual complainant or even a group
of complainants will inadequately frame a larger social rights
problem. I04 Unlike some of the legitimacy issues discussed previously,
the plaintiff problem remains a valid concern that the Court would
have recognized as a challenge to be addressed in the formulation of
its jurisprudence.
The information problem highlights a fundamental difference
between courts and legislatures. If a legislature wishes to implement
a new social program, it has the capacity to engage in fact-finding
and research and to requisition state funds to ensure those
investigations happen. Courts traditionally work exclusively from the
record before them and appellate courts work from the factual record
of the trial court. As with the plaintiff problem, certain procedures
and practices of the South Mrican Constitutional Court partially
address this concern. The Court routinely issues orders to the parties
prior to the hearing, during the hearing, or even during post-hearing
deliberations that invite one or both of the parties to make
submissions of reports, studies, or other factual documentation for
the justices to review. The broad discretion of the Court to order such
filings is based on its constitutional mandate, and the Court has
frequently used this practice to solicit additional information or to
permit amici filings of interested parties. lOS This expands the Court's
capacity'to gather information even though it does not fully address
the concern. It allows the Court to request any information it
requires but does not ensure the quality of the information received,
nor does it ensure that such investigations have actually happened or
that the information is available to be presented to the Court.
Ultimately, the Court must still evaluate whether or not the

103.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 38 and ch. 8, § 172(2)(d).
104.
In many ways, this difficulty is similar to the plaintiff problem
encountered in class action lawsuits.
105.
ld. ch 8, § 173 (the Constitutional Court has "inherent power to
protect and regulate their own process . . . taking into account the interests of
justice.").
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information it receives is sufficient for its decision-making
requirements. The information problem is also a concern the Court
knew it would have to address as it developed its jurisprudence.
Like its procedures and rules regarding access, the remedial
powers of the Constitutional Court are very broad-both in initial
grant and in their interpretation by the Court itself.lo6 The Court
must strike down a provision it finds to be unconstitutional and it
may make any "just and equitable" remedial order to the successful
party.107 As a consequence, the remedy problem, the third difficulty
presented by the adjudication of socio-economic rights, remains
significant. How does a court appropriately tailor a social rights
remedy so as not to bankrupt the state? The constitutional text of
most of the social rights provides guidance through the internal
limitations clause (permitting "progressive realization" of the right
and only requiring state action "within its available resources"I08),
but the text fails to identify how the Court should evaluate the
relative speed of realization or the true extent of available
resources-a built-in constitutional limit on the remedies. The
incapacity of courts to formulate just and appropriate remedies
without usurping legislative authority over budgeting is a
fundamental argument of justiciability opponents. This is an
additional concern the Court knew it would have to address in
formulating its jurisprudence.

[d. § 172 states:
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a
court(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent
of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable,
including(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the
declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity
for any period and on any conditions, to allow the
competent authority to correct the defect.
107.
[d. § 172.
108.
[d. ch. 2, § 27(2).
106.

(1)
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Non-Justiciability Arguments Before the South
African Constitutional Court

The South Mrican Constitutional Court articulates a
jurisprudence that must account not for the numerous historical
critiques of social rights adjudication but rather for the limited
number of critiques that remain once the Court has set aside the
discredited descriptions of social rights and the concerns that are
inapt under the specific South African constitutional model.
As discussed above, the traditional critiques start with
concerns about social rights per se. These arguments are mostly
misguided in their unsubstantiated distinctions between (positive)
social rights and (negative) political rights. The strongest challenges
highlight the novelty of enforcing such rights and the relative dearth
of outside guidance with respect to their interpretation and
application. Secondly, the justiciability critiques focus on judicial
review per se-arguments based on the legitimacy and competence of
courts. Here, some concerns are partially addressed by the expansive
role granted to the Court by the South African Constitution: its
generous access provisions, its broad discretion to solicit information,
and its mandate to advance constitutional values. The strongest
critiques, arguably the only valid critiques in light of the unique
constitutional authority of the South Mrican Constitutional Court,
are: (1) the potentially insufficient number, diversity, or relevance of
its plaintiffs; (2) the difficulty of gathering and considering the
relevant factual information; and (3) the appropriateness of the
remedial actions available to the Court, especially as related to the
fiscal impact of decisions. It is these concerns-the plaintiff problem,
the information problem, and the remedy problem-as well as the
pure novelty of the adjudication of socio-economic rights that would
have occupied the mind of a diligent justice embarking on a novel
South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence. As we shall now
examine, the manner in which the Court addresses these challenges
shapes the jurisprudence of the South Mrican Constitutional Court.
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IV. SOCIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT

A.

The Constitutional Court as an Institution

The South African Constitutional Court's socio-economic
rights cases and the jurisprudence they embody must be understood
in the context of the Court as a uniquely powerful institution with
broad constitutional and moral authority to advance the human
rights goals of the post-apartheid South Mrica. At his retirement, the
first President of the Court affirmed its unique role:
What the Constitution demands of [the Court's justices] is
that a legal order be established that gives substance to its
founding values-democracy, dignity, equality and freedom;
a legal order consistent with the constitutional goal of
improving the quality of life of all citizens, and freeing the
potential of each person. The challenge facing us as a
nation is to create such a society; the challenge facing the
judiciary is to build a legal framework consistent with this
goal. 109

The South African Constitutional Court commenced work in
February 1995 without many of the infirmities that typify many new
constitutional courtS. 110 First, there was no uncertainty about the
Court's judicial review authority; it had a clear mandate for its duties
in the Constitution. Moreover, South Africa did not lack a judicial
culture or judicial structures as many new democracies do. It had an
established infrastructure for enforcement and adjudication that is
typically underdeveloped in fledgling democracies. Also, the Court
had extensive political and popular support from its initiation. III
109.
Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the Const. Ct. of S. Afr.,
Justice
Chaskalson's
Farewell
Speech
(June
2,
2005),
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/sitelfarewell.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2007) [hereinafter Justice Chaskalson's Farewell Speech]. Chaskalson's title and
role was changed from President of the Constitutional Court to Chief Justice of
South Africa during his tenure on the Court.
110.
Much of the information in this section draws upon Christiansen, An
Appropriately Activist Court, supra note 102.
111.
Although there was significant debate about the form of the Bill of
Rights, formation of a constitutional court was a given in the constitutional
drafting process, accepted by all of the negotiating parties at the initial
constitutional negotiations, and unquestioned in the drafting of the final
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As a consequence, the Court was not focused on establishing
institutional legitimacy, rule of law, or judicial systems. It was
expected to transform the judiciary that had functioned under the
apartheid system for decades. The broad authority of the
Constitutional Court allowed it to supervise the lower courts and to
enforce the new constitutional values. Only a court with very
extensive jurisdiction, liberal allowance of access, and broad remedial
authority could oversee the reformation, or at least the functional
obedience, of the judiciary.1I2 Granting the Court these capacities
reflected a conscious vesting of authority in the Constitutional Court.
Moreover, the power of the Court is only minimally
restrained by external forces. As a new institution interpreting a new
constitution in a new democracy, the Court is working from a clean
slate. At present, it must reconcile its judgments with less than
twelve years of precedents. I 13 Even the Court's required surveys of
foreign and international law do little to constrain the outcome of its
cases because of the non-binding and often malleable nature of

Constitution. See Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of
Agreement and Disagreement, 21 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 13 (1989-1990); see
also e-mail from Albie Sachs, Justice, Const. Ct. of S. Afr., to author (January 6,
2000) (on file with author).
112.
Because there was no purge of the civil service or of the judiciary at
the birth of the newly democratic South Africa in 1994, the judges filling the
courts of South Mrica-now empowered to enforce the country's progressive
human rights provisions against a host of new laws issued from the first freelyelected, multiracial Parliament-were the judges appointed by and tutored in the
apartheid law and parliamentary sovereignty of the previous regime. Broad
jurisdiction allowed the Court to address counter-constitutional judgments in all
courts whether their judges were reviewing the constitutionality of laws passed
by national or provincial legislatures, reviewing executive or administrative
action, or hearing appeals from a lower court. This allowed the Court to supervise
the new guardians of the Constitution.
113.
The Court heard its first case on April 5, 1995 and announced its first
judgment on June 6, 1995. State v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 656 (S. Afr.);
State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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foreign precedent. I 14 Political control over the Court is also extremely
limited due to provisions to ensure judicial independence. I IS
The South Mrican Constitutional Court is centrally involved
in the ideological project of the "new South Mrica." As former Chief
Justice Chaskalson described it, "[u]nder our Constitution the
normative value system and the goal of transformation, are
intertwined."116 This ideology is focused on an image of South Africa
as a reformed nation-not just a liberal democracy but a "human
rights state"-which is in the process of rising to its great potential to
transform itself and to be an example to other nations. I I? The Court
plays the role of chief architect of a "society based on democratic
values, social justice and fundamental human rights.,,118 And, with an
eye on the international community, the Court's work helps to build
a "united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place
as a sovereign state in the family of nations.,,119 In pursuit of this
project, the Court has boldly advanced traditional political rightsreviewing controversial matters and issuing disfavored rulings
related to the death penalty, same-sex marriage, and political
amnesty for apartheid crimes, among other issues. 12o Furthermore,

114.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 39(1) (when interpreting the Bill of Rights,
the Court "must consider international law; and may consider foreign law").
Typically the Court reviews contrary holdings merely to differentiate them from
South African circumstances and reviews consistent opinions only as support for
its conclusions.
115.
[d. § 177. (Judges serve non-renewable terms and can be removed only
by a declaration by a politically independent commission in conjunction with a
super-majority of the Assembly.) Judicial independence was also a frequently
discussed issue in the constitutional debates. See generally Debates of the
Constitutional Assembly, supra note 22 (reflecting how judicial independence was
a recurring theme in presentations by members of various political parties).
116.
Justice Chaskalson's Farewell Speech, supra note 109.
117.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, pmbl.
118.
[d.
119.
[d.
120.
State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding the death
penalty unconstitutional); National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality
(NCGLE) v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) (striking down
apartheid-era sodomy laws); Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie
2006(1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding the restriction of civil marriage to
heterosexuals to be unconstitutional); and Azanian People's Organization
(AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Afr.)
(upholding post-apartheid amnesty law under the Interim Constitution).
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the Court has made full and frequent use of its broad remedial
powers-overturning provincial and national laws, invalidating
provincial constitutional provisions, "reading in" text to remedy
constitutional violations, and postponing enforcement to require
executive or legislative action. 121
The development of South Africa's case law related to socioeconomic rights must be understood in the context of an
authoritative, respected, and transformation-oriented court-a court
that has expansively interpreted political rights and generously
applied its remedial powers.

B.

Socio-Economic Rights Cases Before the Constitutional
Court
.

1.

In re: Certification

The Court began hearing substantive cases (under the
Interim Constitution) in February 1995. When the Constitutional
Assembly finished the official draft of the final Constitution in late
1996, the Court had to adjudicate a singularly important case; it had
to "certify" the proposed final Constitution by ensuring that none of
its provisions conflicted with the Thirty-four Principles agreed upon
by the ANC, the outgoing white minority government, and other
political parties at CODESA. 122 The Thirty-four Principles in the

121.
See, e.g., Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC)
para. 19 (S. Afr.) (The Court "may even have to fashion new remedies to secure
the protection and enforcement" of the Constitution); Fraser v Children's Court,
Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (Ce) (S. Afr.) (suspending enforcement of the
court order striking down a portion of the state's adoption laws to permit
Parliament to amend the law without the adverse consequences that would result
from an immediate declaration of invalidity); National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para.
86 (S. Afr.) (The Court "cured" the unconstitutional provision of the immigration
law "by reading in, after the word 'spouse,' the following words: 'or partner, in a
permanent same-sex life partnership.'").
The initial review by the Constitutional Court found that "we
122.
ultimately come to the conclusion that the [proposed textl cannot be certified as it
stands because there are several respects in which there has been noncompliance with the [Thirty-four Principlesl," but also noted that, "in general and
in respect of the overwhelming majority of its provisions, the CA has attained
[itsl goal." Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re
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Interim Constitution specifically required or prohibited certain
provisions in the final Constitution. 123 Since the draft included socioeconomic rights, the Court had to adjudicate whether socio-economic
rights could be properly included in the text of the 1996 Constitution
before it considered its first substantive social rights claim.
The challenges to articles 26 (Housing), 27 (Health care, food,
water, and social security) and 29 (Education) were based on
Constitutional Principle II and Constitutional Principle VI of the
Thirty-four Principles. Principle II required:
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental
rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided
for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions
in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having
given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights
contained in Chapter 3 of this [Interim) Constitution. 124

And, Principle VI required: "There shall be a separation of powers
between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate
checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and
openness.,,125 Groups filing arguments in opposition to the inclusion
of social rights claimed that the rights violated Principles II and VI
in light of the fact that the rights (1) were not "universally accepted
fundamental rights," (2) were not justiciable, and, more generally, (3)
violated the constitutional separation of powers by impermissibly
intruding on the legislative arena. 126
With respect to Principle II, the Court had already held that
"universally accepted fundamental rights" did not constitute the

Certification of the amended text of the Const. of the Rep. of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 97
(CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.). Certification of the subsequently amended text was
granted by the full court in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:
In re Certification of the amended text of the Const. of the Rep. of S. Afr. 1996
1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) para. 205 (S. Afr.).
123.
S. Afr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4; see also supra Part II. A.
124.
S. Mr. (Interim) Const. 1993, sched. 4, Principle II.
125.
Id. Principle VI.
126.
The opposition groups included the South African Institute for Race
Relations (an organization supporting "economic liberalism"), the Free Market
Foundation, and the Gauteng Association of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry. See In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
paras. 76-78; Liebenberg, supra note 2, at *1, n.ll. For a report of some of the
Court's discussion of the certification question as it relates to socio-economic
rights, see The Post-Apartheid Constitutions, supra note 25.

2007]

ADJUDICATING NON-JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS

359

ceiling for rights, but rather the floor, and that they could be
supplemented by the Constitutional Assembly with "other rights not
universally accepted."127 It went on to address the other two issues,
holding:
(W]e are ofthe view that [social] rights are, at least to some
extent, justiciable ... many of the civil and political rights
entrenched in the [proposed constitutional text] will give
rise
to
similar budgetary
implications
without
compromising their justiciability. The fact that socioeconomic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such
implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their
. t"lClab'l't
JUs
1 1 y. 128

With respect to Principle VI, the Court held simply and with little
analysis, "it cannot be said that by including socio-economic
rights ... a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that
ordinarily conferred upon them ... that it results in a breach of the
separation ofpowers."129
The threshold importance of the Certification judgment is
that it permitted inclusion of socio-economic rights in the final text of
the South Mrican Constitution. Furthermore, the Court asserted
some justiciability of such rights: "At the very minimum, socioeconomic rights can be negatively protected from improper
invasion."13o The Court thereby declared a "floor" of minimum
justiciability; it will not permit government interference with access
to the social right in question nor discrimination in provision of such
rights.
The questions that remained after the Certification opinion
were many. While the justiciability question (whether such rights
could be adjudicated) was answered, the enforceability question (how
such rights would be adjudicated) remained. Two years later, the
Court addressed the enforcement question in its first substantive
social rights case.

127.
para. 76.
128.
129.
130.

In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
Id. para. 78.
Id. para. 77.
Id. para. 78.
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Soobramoney

In 1997, the Constitutional Court decided its first substantive
socio-economic rights case, Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of
Health, KwaZulu-Natal. 131 Mr. Soobramoney was a terminally-ill
diabetic man in the final stages of chronic renal failure. Due to
limited hospital resources, he was denied dialysis treatment that
could have prolonged his life under a state medical policy that
restricted dialysis availability to patients whose acute renal failure
could be remedied through such treatment or to patients eligible for a
kidney transplant. Mr. Soobramoney's kidney failure could not be
remedied and he was ineligible for a transplant because of other
health issues. The appellant wanted the Court to order the hospital
to provide the treatment to extend his life. He relied on Section 27(3)
of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o one may be refused
emergency medical treatment,,,132 and Section 11 of the Constitution,
which states that "[e]veryone has the right to life,"133 to claim that
after significant time without the treatment, his now-imminent
death created a medical emergency upon which his life depended. 134
The Court found that the right to "emergency medical
treatment" could not extend to life-prolonging treatment for
terminally ill patients. Not only did the ordinary meaning of the
words argue against that interpretation, but the consequences of
such an interpretation in the circumstance of limited resources would
be a functional prioritization of health maintenance of the terminally
ill over all other health needs. The Court found that the "context" of
the right-usually examined by the Court to justify a generous
interpretation 135-encouraged a narrow reading of this particular
right. Additionally, the Court held that the right not to be refused
emergency medical treatment was best understood in the context of

131.
Soobramoney, supra note 1.
132.
8 Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §27(3).
133.
Id. §11.
134.
Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 7.
135.
See, e.g., State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) 8A 391 (CC) para. 10 (8. Afr.)
(context "includes the history and background to the adoption ofthe Constitution,
other provisions of the Constitution itself, and, in particular, the provisions of
[the Bill of Rightsl of which [they are] part.").
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the Section 27 right to health care rather than in conjunction with
the right to life. 136
Although it was not argued by the appellants, the Court went
on to consider whether the Section 27(1) right of access to health care
services provided relief for this appellant. 137 The Court held that
Section 27 rights must be read in the context of the state's limited
resources as expressly stated in 27(2), the internal limitation clause:
"The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of [the right of access to healthcare]."138 The provincial government
offered evidence that it had to balance a great number of health
priorities with a woefully inadequate budget. The Court concluded
that "[a] court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken
in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose
responsibility it is to deal with such matters."139 Upon examination of
the actual medical and financial bases for the policy, the source and
enforcement of the policy, and both the health services and general
budgets of the KwaZulu-Natal province, the Court rejected Mr.
Soobramoney's arguments and ruled for the Minister of Health. 140
The Soobramoney decision is important for several reasons ..
First, the duty of the state in relation to socio-economic rights was
affirmed in clear terms. 141 This is an important step beyond the mere
abstract assertion of justiciability in the Certification opinion. The
Court expressly finds that the state's affirmative obligation (in
conjunction with the previously-asserted justiciability of social
rights) yields judicially enforceable socio-economic rights.
Second, the Court identified a standard of qualified deference
to the legislature. Reviewing the state health care policies at issue,
the Court stressed the existence of established, public guidelines that
conform to legitimate medical opinions. The Court implies that the
analysis would be different where the guidelines are "unreasonable

136.
Soobramoney, supra note 1, paras. 14-19.
137.
Id. paras. 19-36.
138.
S Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 27(2).
139.
Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 29.
140.
Id. para. 36.
141.
Id. ("The state has a constitutional duty to comply with the
obligations imposed on it by s[ectionj 27 ofthe Constitution.").
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or . . . were not applied fairly and rationally.,,142 The Court
highlighted that the decisions taken in these circumstances were
appropriately divided between politicians and non-political
specialists (here, medical experts): "These choices involve difficult
decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget,
and at the functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be
met."143 The relative apportionment of decision making between
political and functional "levels" is not revealed in this case, and thus
little guidance is available for future cases, because here the Court
found a fair and rational policy.l44
Third, it is crucial to notice that the Court reviewed the
actual evidence of the financial status of the hospital and the
KwaZulu Province and confirmed that other practical solutions were
considered. 145 This shows that the Court's holding is deferential to
economic limitations, but it is not deferential to the state's mere
assertions of economic limitations. Where reasonable resource
limitations diminish the extent of a constitutional right, such
limitations must be proven to the Court. The government cannot "toll
the bell of lack of resources" and expect the Court to passively defer
to the legislative judgment. 146
Fourth, the Court is very concerned with providing a solution
for the larger societal problem represented by Soobramoney, and not
merely solving the appellant's problem. "If everyone in the same
condition as the appellant were to be admitted the carefully tailored
programme would collapse and no one would benefit .... "147 In this
way, the Court acknowledges and at least partially addresses the
plaintiffs problem, the single controversy-based objection to social
rights adjudication. Realism and perspective will temper
constitutional obligations.
Finally, the Court stressed the connection between the
available resources and the extent of the right: "the obligations
imposed on the State by [Sections] 26 and 27 in regard to access to

142.
143.
144.
IV.B.3-4.
145.
146.
147.

[d. para. 25.
[d. para. 29 (emphases added).
See discussion of "reasonableness" in Grootboom and TAC infra Part

Soobramoney, supra note 1, paras. 25-28.
[d. para. 52 (Sachs, J., concurring).
[d. para. 26.
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housing, health care, food, water, and social security are dependent
upon the resources available for such purposes, and . . . the
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of the lack of
resources."148 The Court thus identifies two further aspects of socioeconomic rights enforceability. The state bears the burden of proving
its actions were reasonable in light of limited resources, rather than,
as with political rights adjudication, proving an allowable limitation
of the right according to the general limitations clause. 149
Additionally, this formulation means that the state's obligation is
dynamic. It will change as circumstances change, and presumptively
it will increase over time. Hence, the Court may revisit the
reasonableness of static government programs. Even more
importantly, to the extent that the scope of the right is delineated by
the socio-economic right's internal limitations clause, the Court
avoids some of the issues raised by the remedy problem. This is
because the size of the remedy depends on the extent of the right,
which is partially determined by the availability of resources.
It should also be noted that there were several ways in which
Soobramoney was an easy first case for the Court. There was no
principled way to provide a remedy for this appellant only, and
ordering the requested remedy for all similarly-situated patients was
a fiscal impossibility that even the judgment's critics recognized.
Also, medical matters possess more verifiable evidence regarding cost
and the impact of withholding versus providing rights-related
treatment. Because relatively precise financial data was available to
assess the costs of various options, a somewhat more objective

148.
149.

[d. para. 11.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 36 [Limitation ofrightsl:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms
oflaw of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors, including(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance ofthe purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
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balancing of priorities was possible-at least in comparison to some
other socio-economic rights. But after Soobramoney, many questions
remained. And the death of Mr. Soobramoney two days after the
judgment was announced fueled popular concerns that the Court was
unwilling to enforce the Constitution's social rights. 150

3.

Grootboom

Five years passed between Soobramoney and the
Constitutional Court's next significant ruling related to a social
right-years of very slow progress on economic fronts and increasing
crime and violence for many impoverished South Africans. Economic
opportunity was still in short supply and vast numbers of South
Africans were living in desperate poverty. For those who hoped the
Court would take an active role in the advancement of socio-economic
opportunity and substantive equality, the Court's jurisprudenceother than the hopeful abstractions in the Certification opinion-had
been disappointing. In fact, the Court itself acknowledged "the harsh
reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and equality for all
remains for many a distant dream.,,151
In 2001, the Court returned to the adjudication of socioeconomic rights with the housing rights case Government of Republic
of South Africa v Irene Grootboom and Others. 152 The Court took
several months to consider the claims (rather than two weeks as with
Soobramoney). As a consequence, the Court, in a unanimous
judgment, presented a much more detailed and thorough opinion
than it had in the previous case.
The case reviewed the obligations of the state as a result of
Section 26, Housing: "[e]veryone has the right to have access to
adequate housing" and "[t]he state must take reasonable legislative
and other measures, within its available resource, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right .... ,"153 and Section 28, Children:

150.
Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They be Made
Justiciable?, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1381, 1386 (2000) ("The public was angry with the
Court-they felt it should have done something, anything, to save a life.").
151.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 2.
152.
[d.
153.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §26.
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"[e]very child has the right to . . . basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services .... "154
The facts that gave rise to the Grootboom dispute are no less
disturbing for being one instance of a common failure of South
Africa's housing infrastructure. Irene Grootboom became homeless
when she was required to leave a squatter settlement on private land
that had been selected for construction of state-sponsored low-income
housing. She and the 510 children and 390 adults who joined her suit
were then forcibly and inhumanely evicted from their new informal
settlement, with their possessions burned and homes destroyed. ISS In
Grootboom, national, provincial, and local government bodies were
challenging an order from the Cape High Court, 156 which required the
"appropriate government organ" to provide shelter for the plaintiff
children and their parents until the parents could themselves provide
shelter for their children. 157
The Constitutional Court conducted a very close reading of
the constitutional text and analyzed the social context of its drafting.
It recognized that housing was "a constitutional issue of fundamental
importance to the development of South Africa's new constitutional
order."158 Yet, despite enormous efforts and notwithstanding
significant advancements in the decade following the end of
apartheid, adequate housing has remained unavailable to many
South Mricans. 159 The Court first identified the state's negative
obligation, "to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access
to adequate housing.,,16o In discussing the positive obligations, the

154.
Id. §28.
Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 7-11.
155.
156.
In the South African judicial system, High Courts are courts of first
instance. Although direct application to the Constitutional Court is allowed in the
Constitution, most cases begin in the High Courts and are reviewed by the
Supreme Court of Appeals prior to reaching the Constitutional Court.
157.
The High Court had held that the relevant government bodies had
met their constitutional duty under Section 26 (housing) but had failed to meet
their duty under Section 28 (minimum services for children). The High Court
held that the "spirit" of Section 28 required that the order "should take account of
the need of the child to be accompanied by his or her parent" and thus a parent
was to accompany the child in the shelter provided. Grootboom, supra note 9,
paras. 14-16.
158.
Id. para. 2.
Toward 10 Years of Freedom, supra note 28, at 1.
159.
160.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 34.
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Court focused on three aspects of Section 26: it calls for legislative
and other measures, it recognizes the limitations of available
resources, and it permits progressive realization. The Court
essentially conflates these three elements into a reasonableness
analysis: "[T]he real question in terms of our Constitution is whether
the measures taken by the state to realise the right afforded by
[Section] 26 are reasonable.,,161 The Court requires a broad policy
with particular attention paid to those who are most vulnerable and
implementation that includes "all reasonable steps necessary to
initiate and sustain,,162 the program.
Ai3 described in Grootboom, reasonableness requires state
authorities (at all levels) to "devise, fund, implement, and supervise"
measures related to the right of access to housing. 163 The Court
acknowledged that "a wide range of possible measures could be
adopted by the State . . . [that] would meet the requirement
of reasonableness."l64 Nevertheless, while praising much about the
current housing policies of the government, the Court held that the
current system unreasonably neglected to consider and address those
in most dire need. The current program "fell short of constitutional
compliance" because it failed to "devise and implement within its
available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme
progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing.,,165
The Court issued a declaratory order requiring the state to remedy
this failing and assigned the Human Rights Commission, an
independent national body, to monitor and report on the status of the
changes. Referencing a new housing plan proposed during the
appeals process, the Court indicated that it, or a similar plan of the
government's choosing, should be implemented "to provide relief for
people who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who
are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations."166

The Court's Grootboom opmIOn couples its specific
application of the Constitution's social rights provisions with an
analytical and abstract discussion of the adjudication of socio-

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para. 33.
paras. 36, 67.
para. 96.
para. 4l.
para. 99.
para. 99.
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economic rights. The Court dispensed with the justiciability question
early in its opinion: "The question is therefore not whether socioeconomic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, but how to
enforce them in a given case."16? Determining the appropriate means
of enforcement following Grootboom involves a case-by-case
assessment. The Court looks at the constitutional provisions
themselves, examines the context of the right-the "textual setting"
within the Constitution as well as the "social and historical
context"-and then applies what is learned to the specific
circumstances of the case. 168 No order was issued to directly address
the situation of the plaintiffs. Rather summarily, the Court states
that neither of the rights in question "entitles the respondents to
claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand."169
By choosing this path, the Court unexpectedly rejects the
enforcement of social rights through "minimum core" analysis.
Minimum core analysis, used by the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Committee), in its nonbinding general comments and concluding observations on nation
reports under the ICESCR, attempts to "ensure the satisfaction of, at
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights"I?O by
state parties to the ICESCR. The minimum core for a particular right
is gleaned by the UN Committee after years of extensive review of
country reports submitted by state signatories. Every effort must be
made by the state to satisfy the identified minimum core obligation.
Therefore, it defines a "floor" of socio-economic conditions. While the
Court rejects this procedure as unavailable to it because it lacks the
extensive information resources of the UN Committee, it agrees with
one aspect of the UN Committee's inquiry: the necessity for a
determination ''having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable
group that is entitled to protection of the right in question."I?1
While Grootboom is undoubtedly a victory for those favoring
robust enforcement of socio-economic rights, the limits of that

167.
Id. para. 20.
168.
Id. para. 22.
Id.paras.68,95.
169.
170.
U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts. [UNHCHR), Comm. on
Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights [CESR), General Comment 3: The Nature of
States Parties Obligations, § 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991123 (Dec. 14, 1990).
171.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 31.
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enforcement remain unclear. The Court was certainly aware of the
import of its judgment and its inevitable impact upon future socioeconomic rights jurisprudence. The result was a "cautiously crafted
opinion" that could represent the furthest extent of judicial
enforceability or a tentative step toward a much more expansive
jurisprudence. 172 How far will the Court go in its enforcement of
socio-economic rights? Subsequent cases have demonstrated the
Court's willingness to go further, but have not yet delineated the
boundaries of the Court's jurisprudence.
4.

Treatment Action Campaign

In 2002, a group of non-governmental organizations, led by
the advocacy group Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), challenged
the government's policies related to the prevention of mother-to-child
HIV transmission.173 A single dosage of the drug Nevirapine was
known to dramatically decrease the likelihood that an HIV-positive
mother would transmit the virus to her child during childbirth. The
drug manufacturer had agreed to provide the drug to the government
for free for a period of five years. The government had devised a
program for distribution at a limited number of pilot sites (two in
each of South Mrica's eleven provinces) but state doctors outside
such sites were prohibited from administering the drug, even though
it was already tested and approved for use in South Mrica and other
jurisdictions. Only ten percent of the estimated 70,000 annual
affected births were covered by the approved sites. The government's
stated plan was to conduct a multi-year study prior to development of
a national program. 174
The TAC claimed that the program violated the state's
constitutional obligation to "respect, protect, promote and fulfill the
rights in the Bill of Rights,"175 especially as such duty applied to the
right of access to health care services for pregnant woman and

172.
Geoff Budlender & Kgomosoane Mathipe, Community Law Centre,
Summary of Key Themes of the Colloquium, Realising Socio-Economic Rights in
South
Africa:
Progress
and
Challenges
(2002),
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.zaiProjects/Socio-Economic-Rights/
conferences/summary_oCkey_themes_colloquium. pdf.
173.
TAG, supra note 10.
174.
Id.paras. 10-12, 19,62.
175.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, § 7.
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children. 176 The TAC asked the Court to lift the prohibition on
distribution of Nevirapine outside the pilot program and to issue an
order requiring the government to immediately produce a more
expansive national program for the prevention of such transmission.
In its most far-reaching judgment to date, the Court granted both
requests. 177
In a unanimous opinion, the Court referenced a great deal of
information "from a variety of specialised perspectives, ranging from
paediatrics, pharmacology and epidemiology to public health
administration, economics and statistics."178 The Court then applied
the reasonableness test from Grootboom. 179 It held that the
government's goals did not justify the heavy impact the program had
on the ninety percent of poor pregnant women and their children for
whom the treatment was functionally prohibited. The program's
inflexibility and its failure to account for the needs of a particularly
vulnerable group made it unreasonable:
[The] Government policy was an inflexible one that denied
mothers and their newborn children . . . [a] potentially
lifesaving drug . . . . [I]t could have been administered
within the available resources of the State without any
known harm to mother or child . . . . [T]he policy of
government . . . constitutes a breach of the State's
obligations under [Section] 27(2) read with [Section]
27( l)(a) of the Constitution. 180

176.

177.
178.
179.
180.

[d. §§ 27 and 28:
27 Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to(a) health care services, including reproductive health
care; ...
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of each of these rights ...
28 Children
(1) Every child has the right ...
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services
and social services.
TAC, supra note 10, para. 135.
[d. para. 6.
Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 42-44.
TAC, supra note 10, para. 80.
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Additionally, the government's research goals did not justify an
indefinite postponement of development of a comprehensive national
program. 181 The Court held that the government was
"constitutionally obliged . . . to plan and implement an effective,
comprehensive and progressive programme for the prevention of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout the country.,,182 The
Court issued a number of mandatory orders. The government was
required to remove the prohibitions on distribution of Nevirapine
"without delay" and to facilitate its availability at sites outside the
pilot sites so that the drug could be administered where medically
indicated. The government was also required, as part of an
immediate national program, to extend testing and counseling
facilities related to mother-to-child transmission throughout the
public health sector.183
With its extensive remedy, the TAC judgment either draws
closest to the nightmare scenario of judicial overreaching dreaded by
opponents of justiciability or approaches the judicial realization of
the constitutional text's transformative social values as favored by
supporters. But even this ruling evidenced some judicial restraint.
First, the Court rejected a request for ongoing judicial supervision of
the government's HIV programs, despite a request for such a
supervisory order from the complainants. 184 More notably, despite its
extensive orders related to Nevirapine, the Court did not carry
forward the lower court's order for the state to provide infant formula

181.
182.
183.

Id. para. 122.
Id. para. 5.
Id. para. 135:
Government is ordered without delay to:
(a) Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine
from being made available ... at public hospitals and
clinics that are not research and training sites.
(b) Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine ... at
hospitals and clinics when ... medically indicated,
which shall if necessary include that the mother
concerned has been appropriately tested and
counselled.
(c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors based
at public hospitals and clinics other than the research
and training sites ....
184.
But lower courts in South Africa have not been as hesitant to issue
supervisory orders. See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.12.
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to poor mothers-which was, along with client counseling, the most
expensive element of the lower court's order. 185 Instead, the Court
found that there was not "sufficient evidence to justify an order that
formula feed must be made available by the government on request
and without charge in every case."186 The clear implication of this
finding, however, is that such an order is not beyond the scope of the
Court's authority; the Court was merely unable to obtain the
necessary factual basis to make such an order in the context of this
case. 187
5.

Other Social Rights Cases Before the Court

The previously discussed substantive cases-Soobramoney,
Grootboom, and TAC-represent the preponderance of the Court's
socio-economic rights jurisprudence to date. Nevertheless, there are
additional cases related to social rights that also contribute to the
development of the Court's jurisprudence. Each of these other cases
required the Court to analyze social rights outside the fairly uniform
model presented by the three central cases. 188 Two of these cases are
examined below. In Jaftha v Schoeman, the Court focused on
enforcement of the negative rather than positive element of a social
right,189 and in Khosa v Minister of Social Development the Court
evaluated the merits of a social rights claim in connection with other
constitutional rights. 190
In Jaftha, the appellants were rendered homeless when their
residences were sold to recover purchase money and housing debt
fines owed to another private party.191 They claimed a violation of the
negative aspects of the right to housing in Section 26. The positive
aspect of the right, that the state "must take reasonable legislative

185.
TAC, supra note 10, para. 48.
186.
[d. para. 128.
187.
[d. ("Whether it is desirable to use this substitute rather than
breastfeeding raises complex issues, particularly when the mother concerned may
not have easy access to clean water or the ability to adopt a bottle-feeding
regimen because of her personal circumstances.").
188.
See SERP's Case Reviews, supra note 5 (identifying and summarizing
other socio-economic rights cases).
189.
Jaftha v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.).
190.
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505
(CC) (S. Afr.).
191.
Jaftha 2005 (2) SA 140, paras. 3-5.
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and other measures . . . to achieve . . . realization of' the right to
housing, was not relevant because the appellants already had homes
prior to their forced sale. 192 As a consequence, this meant that the
internal limitations clause was also irrelevant to the case, because
the "within available resources" and "progressive realization"
qualifications apply only to the government's affirmative duties to
advance the right. 193
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Mokgoro affirmed the
existence of the negative component to social rights and held:
It is not necessary in this case to delineate all the

circumstances in which a measure will constitute a
violation of the negative obligations imposed by the
Constitution. However, . . . I conclude that, at the very
least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of
existing access to adequate housing limits the rights
protected in section 26(1).194

Although the internal limitations clause did not apply, the Court
examined a limitation on the negative aspect of a social right under
the general limitations clause, the standard for assessing limitations
on a civil or political right. 195 The Court concluded that the lack of
judicial oversight for the forced sale procedure made the action an
unconstitutional violation of Section 26. 196
In Khosa, the appellants challenged government denial of
social welfare grants to otherwise qualified children and elderly
persons because they were permanent residents of South Africa
rather than citizens.197 The Court examined the case under Section
27's right to social security: "Everyone has the right to have access to
. . . social security, including, if they are unable to support
themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance. "198
Because the Court held that use of the word "everyone" in the text of
Section 27 differentiated it from provisions granting rights to
"citizens," the restrictions on social security in Khosa were examined

See id. paras. 31-33.
[d.
[d. para. 34.
[d.
[d. paras. 52-55.
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505
(CC) (S. Afr.).
198.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, § 27.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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in conjunction with the rights to equality, life, and dignity for
everyone. 199
In reviewing the reasonableness of the limitation, the Court
highlighted two issues: (1) that financially-based limitations were
permitted because of the Section 27(2) internal limitation clause and
(2) that other constitutional rights were clearly implicated in the
government's plan. While acknowledging that the State "may be able
to justify not paying benefits to everyone," the majority required that
once a benefits program was initiated, "the criteria upon which they
choose to limit the payment of those benefits (in this case citizenship)
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole. "200 Mter
considerable analysis of the purpose and effect of the right to social
security,201 the validity of differentiation based on citizenship,202 and
the actual financial claims made by the government,203 the Court
determined that the restriction was unreasonable and violated the
rights to both equality and social security. As a result, non-citizen
permanent residents are now eligible for grants where similarlysituated citizens would also receive them. 204
It is still too early to tell if the growing number of cases
involving social rights, in addition to traditional civil and political
rights or enforcement of the negative aspect of social rights, will
impact the Court's jurisprudence significantly.20s Such adjudication,
however, certainly complements the more direct advancement of
social welfare in the primary cases discussed above and expands the
reach ofthe Court's social rights jurisprudence.

199.
Khosa 2004 (6) SA 505, paras. 40-4l.
200.
Id. para. 44.
201.
Id. paras. 50-52.
202.
Id. paras. 53-57.
203.
Id. paras. 58-62.
204.
Id. para. 98 (reading in the words "or permanent resident" following
"citizens" in the relevant parts of the legislation).
205.
See, e.g., President of the Republic of S. Afr. v Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that a private landowner was owed
compensation for occupation of his land once the government failed to enforce a
legal eviction against 40,000 squatters; squatters permitted to remain until
alternative sites made available); see also Minister of Pub. Works and Others v
Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Assn. and Others 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (S. Afr.) (rejecting
procedural and property right challenges to the establishment of emergency
housing site on government land).
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An Affirmative Socio-Economic Jurisprudence

The South African Constitutional Court's burgeoning
jurisprudence of socio-economic rights is presented in the cases
discussed above. The Court addresses the justiciability question
directly and delineates its method for addressing both the negative
and positive elements of the express social rights into the South
African Constitution. Synthesizing what the judgments evidence
about the Court's social rights jurisprudence reveals much about how
the Court will adjudicate and enforce socio-economic rights in future
cases.
1.

Justiciability

The question of justiciability is a settled point of law. As was
said in Grootboom, "[socio-economic rights] are rights, and the
Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an
obligation that the Courts can, and in appropriate circumstances,
must enforce.,,206 Ultimately, this issue was easy for the Court to
resolve because social rights are enumerated in the text of the
Constitution and because the Court had addressed the initial
objections to the justiciability of such rights directly in the
Certification opinion.

2.

Negative Enforcement

As a consequence of the "easy" justiciability determination,
the heft of the Court's innovative jurisprudence addresses the "how"
of adjudication-enforcement-rather than the "if'-justiciability.
The Court views each right as having negative and positive
aspects. 207 However, to date, only one case has formally identified a
violation of the negative aspects of the right, what the Grootboom
case called "a negative obligation placed upon the State and all other
entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the
right .... "208

206.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 94.
207.
In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 7,
para. 78; Grootboom, supra note 9, paras. 34-38; TAC, supra note 10, para. 46.
208.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 34.
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Judicial review of the negative elements of social rights is not
subject to the internal limitations clause, although it is subject to
review against the Constitution's general limitations clause?09 This
is because the "progressive realization" clause and the "within
available resources" clause arise from and qualify the positive
obligation to "take reasonable legislative and other measures.'>2IO The
Court's analysis of the negative aspect is a more direct application of
traditional South Mrican rights analysis and will often be evaluated
in conjunction with a violation of the right to equality or dignity.2lI
3.

Positive Enforcement

The positive aspects of a right are also enforceable, but they
give rise to complications that make them more difficult to enforce
judicially. Also, it is the positive aspects of social rights that give rise
to most of the traditional justiciability concerns. The most important
of these considerations is the connection between the obligation of
the state and the state's available resources. In the Soobramoney
case, the dissent said that the "rights themselves are limited by
reason of a lack of resources."212 However, the state may not merely
assert a lack of available funding as a justification for doing nothing
to advance a social right. The burden of evidencing resource
limitations is borne by the state and the Court will actively analyze
the state's proffered claims. Moreover, the "progressive realization"
formulation means that the state's obligation is dynamic: it should
increase over time. Hence, the Court maintains the option to revisit
previously reviewed but static government programs.
4.

Reasonableness

A lack of an affirmative response, or an allegedly inadequate
response, to the positive obligation imposed on the government by
the Constitution's social rights provisions will result in review by the
Constitutional Court. The "obligations imposed on the state ... are

209.
Jaftha v Schoeman and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras. 31-33 (S.
Afr.).
210.
S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 26(2), 27(2), and 29(1)(b).
211.
See, e.g., Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6)
SA 505 (CC) paras. 109, 112-113 (S. Afr.).
212.
Soobramoney, supra note 1, para. 11 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting).
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dependent upon the resources available for such purposes,"213 but the
fulfillment of such obligations will be examined with a
reasonableness inquiry. For this reason, the heft of any adjudication
of socio-economic rights is the assessment of the reasonableness of
the government action or inaction when the right is viewed in
context. The reasonableness standard, which generally encompasses
the internal limitations clause, will guide the Courts's analysis and
"must be determined on the facts of each case."214 Some components
of the reasonableness review are evident in the caselaw: is the
legislative or other government action comprehensive and wellcoordinated; was there appropriate division of political and expert
authority in its formulation; can it facilitate realization of the right
in question; is it balanced and flexible to the extent necessary; and
does it include all significant segments of society and take into
account those persons in the most dire need? In essence, the Court
requires a broad policy-based program with particular attention paid
to those who are most vulnerable and implementation that includes
"all reasonable steps necessary to initiate and sustain" a successful
program to advance the social right.215
5.

Remedies

The South African Constitutional Court has broad remedial
powers to advance the interests of justice in its rulings. Hence, the
remedy chosen and the manner in which the remedy is implemented
are particularly important issues. Where the Court enforces a
positive state obligation it may make use of declaratory, supervisory,
or mandatory orders. The Constitutional Court has not yet made use
of supervisory orders, which would provide for ongoing monitoring by
the Court, even where not requested to do so. Furthermore, to date,
all of its orders relate to the state's programs rather than to an
individual's request for relief. Even when enforcing the negative
aspect of the right, no individual relief has yet been granted in a
socio-economic rights case. Moreover, details of remedial programs
are, wherever possible, left to the appropriate governmental body to
determine.

213.
214.
215.

[d.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 92.
[d. para. 67.
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The Court's assessment and enforcement of social rights is a
first in the field of constitutional jurisprudence. It has created a
viable, comprehensive system of affirmative socio-economic rights
adjudication. But analysis of the Court's judgments also evidences a
series of limitations that do not arise from the Constitution itself and
are not evident in the Court's political rights jurisprudence. These
limits are carefully aligned with certain concerns of those who argue
that social rights are non-justiciable. The Court that passed so
casually over the critique of justiciability in its Certification opinion
has created a jurisprudence that internalizes this critique through
self-imposed limitations. But not all of the traditional critiques of the
justiciability of socio-economic rights were legitimate concerns of the
Court's first generation of justices as they formulated their
affirmative social rights jurisprudence. 216 The three predominant,
extant challenges to justiciability (after accounting for South Mrica's
particular history and constitution) are the plaintiff problem, the
information problem, and the remedy problem.
1.

Plaintiff Problem

The Court accommodates the plaintiff problem by focusing its
adjudication on the characteristics of the government program rather
than on the circumstances of the plaintiff. By focusing on the
attributes of the program-its flexibility, impartiality, basis in
justifiable policy or verifiable information, etc.-the evidence before
the Court is not limited to a snapshot of conditions or the treatment
of one individual. This focus addresses the concern that adjudication
might apply only to one narrow population within an affected
community. For example, adjudication that resulted in meeting the
needs of the plaintiff Irene Grootboqm only (or even of her and her
900 co-plaintiffs only) would still fail to address the larger issue of
the government's obligations related to the right of access to housing.
The Court's approach helps to avoid piecemeal and serial
litigation regarding similar circumstances and also allows the Court
to request improvement of government programs even if there is no
appropriate individual remedy. Moreover, applying a flexible

216.

See discussion supra Part III.
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reasonableness standard to government programs allows more
judicial discretion to broadly investigate the failings of the program,
even if particular faults are not directly related to the plaintiff.
Focusing on the government program rather than on the
aggrieved party, however, raises the possibility that the Court will
not provide justice to the individual before it. In the absence of
individual remedies, the plaintiff must wait for reform of the
government program before her needs are met, i.e., before her
constitutional rights are realized. This is a troubling result of the
jurisprudence in light of the South Mrican Constitutional
dispensation, which seeks to foster a culture of human rights. The
best the Court has been able to do in this regard is to require that the
government program address those in direst need. Arguably, the
declaration of unconstitutionality in the housing program in
Grootboom, because it failed to take into account those "who are
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations," demonstrates
that the Court is advancing the social justice concerns of the
Constitution in its jurisprudence. 217 But this type of enforcement still
causes problems for plaintiffs. Although its requirement to address
the neediest of South Mricans increases the chance of advancing
social transformation to aid all persons similarly situated to the
plaintiff, the Court's accommodation of justiciability concernsespecially the plaintiff problem-has restricted its capacity to
address the individual needs of the plaintiffs before it in court.
2.

Information Problem

Occasionally, the Court seems acutely aware of justiciability
critiques like the information problem. In TAC, it stated: "It should
be borne in mind that in dealing with [social rights] matters the
Courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging
factual and political enquiries necessary . . . ."218 Despite this, the
information problem is not as significant for the South African
Constitutional Court as it might be for other courts. The Court has
interpreted its control over its own procedures to permit it to request

217.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 99; see also TAG, supra note 10, paras.
79-80 (presenting another example by highlighting the inadequacies of the
previous program for Nevirapine distribution in that it impacted most heavily
poor women and children).
218.
TAG, supra note 10, para. 37.
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additional information from one or both parties, to order counsel to
prepare written arguments on issues of interest to the justices (but
not initially covered in the pleadings), and to make submissions
related to factual disputes or relevant policy decisions.219
Nevertheless, only a portion of the information problem is
remedied by broad authority to request additional information. Even
where a court has substantial authority to require submissions, there
are inevitably situations in which the necessary information is
unavailable, indeterminate, or otherwise unhelpful. In such
circumstances, the Court's discretion must control whether or not it
is capable of making a sufficiently informed decision. As the Court
said in Khosa, "[i]t would not, however, have been in the public
interest in this case for this Court to have proceeded with the
hearing without the information necessary for a proper
determination of the case . . . .'>220 For critics of social rights
adjudication whose primary concerns are legitimacy-based, this is an
additional source of consternation. But such critiques remain illsuited to the South African situation. Certainly a Court entrusted
with determination of the constitutionality of the Constitution itself
(as enforcer of the negotiated agreement memorialized in the Interim
Constitution) can be expected to appropriately determine whether it
has sufficient information to adjudicate a particular issue that is
properly before it. Indeed, in at least one circumstance the Court has
drawn fairly narrow distinctions between issues for which the
amount and quality of information is problematic and for which it is
sufficient, i.e., its decision that sufficient studies did not yet exist
regarding the formula feeding element of the lower court's order in
the TAC case. 221
In addition to using its broad procedural authority to gather
information or, where that is inadequate, its discretion to determine
that it lacks the necessary information, the Court has addressed this
justiciability challenge by placing the burden of proof upon the

219.
A review of the (non-substantive) orders of the Constitutional Court
demonstrates the breadth of Constitutional Court capacity of this kind.
220.
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505
(CC) para. 23 (S. Afr.).
221.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.4; accord Khosa and Others v Minister
of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para. 23-25 (S. AfrJ ("This Court
required further information to enable it to discharge its constitutional duty, and
it was in the interests of justice that such information be placed before it.").
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government when it claims a lack of available resources-one of the
most challenging factual inquiries. 222 Placing the burden on the
government addresses the information problem by requiring the
state, the only party with that particular (and critical) information,
to present it to the Court in order to justify its arguments.
3.

Remedy Problem

Although a host of issues are usually highlighted by
opponents of socio-economic rights justiciability, there is little doubt
that the dominant concern is the impact and potential damage of
judicial remedies imposed in social rights cases. Any judicial
determination that intrudes upon a traditional legislative area,
particularly if it has significant budget implications, highlights the
remedy problem. In the extreme circumstance, such remedies are
feared to be capable of bankrupting the State or severely disrupting
implementation of more politically important or democratically
popular programs. The secondary concern is that a court-created
remedy will fail to consider the mechanics of enforcement:
programmatic details, administrative requirements, and other
components commonly devised by the legislative and executive
branches of government. The Court itself has acknowledged the
problem, saying that courts "are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues
where the Court orders could have multiple social and economic
consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates
rather
a
restrained
and
focused
role
for
the
Courts . . . ."223
At an initial level, the solution to the remedy problem lies
with the discretion and restraint of the justices of the Constitutional
Court. The Court's capacity to issue "any order that is just and
equitable" certainly allows it to promote remedies less than the full
reach of the Court's broad remedial authority. Consistent with this
principle, the Court has addressed the remedy problem in at least
three recognizable ways: by deferring to the legislature where no
clear violation of a right has occurred, by assuming as little
traditionally legislative authority as possible regarding remedial

222.
223.

See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.9.
TAC, supra note 10, para. 38.
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program specifics, and by rejecting any form of unqualified rights
that might otherwise call for non-discretionary remedies.
a.

Deference to the Legislature

Wherever it can, the Court affirms-perhaps sometimes
disingenuously-the deference it shows to the legislative branch in
line with the separation of powers: "A court considering
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public
money could have been better spent."224 Nevertheless, the Court will
carefully review the characteristics of allegedly inadequate
legislative programs. The professed deference is only for programs
within the court-identified range of reasonableness. Similarly, the
Court asserts that its remedies intrude as little as possible into other
political branches' territory. "Such determinations of reasonableness
may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves
directed at rearranging budgets."225 In this way the Court's deference
lessens, albeit minimally, the remedy problem and "the judicial,
legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional
balance.,,226
b.

Programmatic Design and Practicalities

For practical reasons and in order to be consistent with "the
deference that courts should show to [policy] decisions taken by the
executive,"227 the Court has attempted to formulate remedies that
guide rather than dictate legislative action. Even in the TAC case,
where it gave its most far-reaching order, the Court insisted that all
available constitutionally consistent options be left open to the
executive.228 Indeed, the Court asserts that a reasonableness inquiry
is as far as it will go. "The precise contours and context of the
measures to be adopted" are the responsibility of the legislature and
executive. 229 The Court identifies constitutional failings in a

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 41.
TAG, supra note 10, para. 38.
[d.
[d. para. 22.
[d. para. 114.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 41.

382

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[38:321

challenged government program and orders a reformulation of it in
accordance with the judgment, but the specific solutions must be
designed and implemented by the legislature. Hence, the new
programs are far more likely to be viable, congruent with other
legislative initiatives, and consistent with civil service best practices.
c.

The Problem with Absolute Rights

Unqualified or unlimited social rights are the greatest
concern of those who argue against the justiciability of socioeconomic rights. From a constitutive theory standpoint, inclusion of
such a right is a radical statement by the drafters that the right
represents a non-negotiable value and it is to be prioritized over all
other state concerns (except other enforceable unqualified rights). In
the South Mrican Constitution, the right to basic education and the
right of children to basic welfare ("basic nutrition, shelter, basic
health care services and social services") are not restricted by an
internal limitation clause as are all other social rights. 230 Such rights
are not subject to progressive realization or the limitations arising
from inadequate state resources. Of course, unrestricted rights do not
mean rights without any substantive limits; the scope of the right
would still be defined by the Court. Rights claims that fall within the
judicially determined substantive scope of an unqualified right,
however, must be satisfied by the state. Even if interpreted at a
minimum, unrestricted rights require de facto prioritization and
involve the courts in their enforcement despite even valid concerns
about legitimacy or judicial capacity. In the traditional critique,
absolute social rights represent a lose-lose scenario for the judiciary.
Either courts enforce the rights and give them an effective priority
even against the wishes of the political branches, or the courts

230.
S. Mr. Const. 1996, ch. 2, §§ 28 and 29. Section 28 (1) reads: "Every
child has the right ... (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate
alternative care when removed from the family environment;
(c)
to
basic
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services ..."
Section 29 (1) reads: "Everyone has the right ... to a basic education, including
adult basic education ...."
Such rights are still subject to the Constitution's general limitations clause (§
36), but the natural reading of § 36 in light of the text of these two rights would
preclude limitations based on the grounds specifically excluded from only these
two social rights. Furthermore, progressive realization and available resources
are not common limitations upon any other rights in the Bill of Rights.
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disregard the clear text and intent of the constitution, thereby
weakening constitutionalism in the state.
Fear of this no-compromise scenario explains the Court's
incongruous treatment of the unqualified Section 28 right to basic
welfare for children in Grootboom. 231 If the Court interprets Section
28 in its textual context, as it requires with all rights, it should hold
that the internal limitations clauses found in other rights do not
apply. This presents the remedy problem at it starkest: even
reasonable limitations on such a right, e.g., legitimate financial
considerations, would be invalid. Provision for children's basic needs
must then be met outside the normal democratic process for
determining the allocation of state resources. This right, and all
other unqualified constitutional rights, must receive priority in the
use of state funds until the need is met. Rejecting this notion of
unlimited pre-commitments, the Court ignores the obvious textual
differences in order to accommodate remedy problem concerns.
Not only unqualified textual rights give rise to absolute
rights. The International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Committee, the preeminent body for defining and evaluating
social rights at an international level, assesses state signatory
compliance with the rights provisions of the ICESCR through the
analysis of "minimum core obligations." Minimum core obligations,
as identified by the ICESCR Committee, identify and require a
minimum acceptable standard for all persons related to each social
right.232 Minimum core rights analysis yields a low substantive
threshold, but mandates it; like enumerated, unqualified rights, it
removes certain expenses from the discretionary review of the
legislature.
Reflecting the prevalence of the minimum core approach and
the Court's obligation to analyze international law, petitioners in
each South African social rights case have argued that the support

231.
Grootboom, supra note 9. The Court has not yet had a case relying on
the right to basic education.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC), Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
232.
Cultural Rights, General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, §
10, U.N. Doc. E/1991123 (Dec. 14, 1990) ("[A] State party in which any significant
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary
health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education
is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.").
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they sought falls within classic minimum core rights analysis. 233 The
Court, however, rejects minimum core analysis, despite the
predominance of such analysis in the work of the ICESCR
Committee. Claiming that "even if it were appropriate to [identify a
minimum core], it could not be done," because of the Court's
inadequate information resources. 234 While a minimum core is
"possibly ... relevant to reasonableness" it is "not ... a self-standing
right conferred on everyone."235 The Court's fear is that, with
minimum core analysis, it would be involved in policy setting and
resource allocation in all areas for which it found a minimum core
obligation. By using the reasonableness standard instead of
minimum core analysis, the Court is able to further evade the
remedy problem.
The Court's refusal to acknowledge the unqualified rights for
children despite the clear text of Section 28 and the history of the
right, as well as the Court's decision not to employ minimum core
analysis despite its prevalence in this field and despite a
constitutional requirement to consider international law when
interpreting rights, can best be explained as the Court's attempt to
craft a jurisprudence that avoids the most threatening aspects of the
remedy problem. Here, as with the plaintiff problem and the
information problem, the Court navigates a jurisprudence that
avoids the perceived pitfalls of social rights adjudication. The result
is an affirmative jurisprudence, the contours of which are best
explained by incorporation of the relevant justiciability critiques.

v.

CONCLUSION

It would be a hollow victory if the people had the right every
five or so years to emerge from their forced-removal hovels . .. to go to
the [polls], only thereafter to return to their inferior houses, inferior
education and inferior jobs. 236

233.
See Liebenberg, supra note 72, § 33.5(e) (providing a discussion about
the Court's rejection of minimum core obligations analysis and a review of the
critiques ofthat position).
234.
Grootboom, supra note 9, para. 33.
235.
TAC, supra note 10, para. 34.
236.
Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa, 6
S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 1, 5 (1980).
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The South Mrican Constitutional Court's role in the debate
about socio-economic rights justiciability has been described as heroic
and revolutionary by one side and as irresponsible and doomed by
the other. Neither side gets it quite right. The Court's jurisprudence
is both more radical and less so than many commentators have
argued. It is less radical, less a departure from the standard concerns
regarding the justiciability of socio-economic rights, in that the
jurisprudence incorporates the norms implicit in the theoretical
critique of such adjudication. And yet, the jurisprudence is also more
radical because, by demonstrating a viable model of social rights
adjudication that incorporates the concerns of its detractors in a
substantive manner, the South Mrican jurisprudence more explicitly
challenges their broadly held non-justiciability viewpoints.
This Article presents this dual view of the current South
Mrican Constitutional Court jurisprudence related to social rights. It
also provides a framework for understanding future decisions of the
Court as it either sustains these limitations in an expression of ongoing respect for theoretical justiciability concerns, or it diminishes
its reliance on such limits as the Court grows more confident in its
role as enforcer of the fundamentally transformative social values in
the South African Constitution. Either way, an understanding of the
Court's practical integration of theoretical justiciability concerns: (1)
introduces a new means of evaluating social rights decision-making
by COurtS;237 (2) illustrates a novel, coherent model for future drafters
of constitutions to address justiciability concerns when incorporating
enforceable rights; and (3) highlights a new means of comparing
social rights drafting decisions and jurisprudence across countries
and historical periods. In the process, it cannot help but honor the
work of those persons-activists, drafters, justices, and others-who

237.
The South African model may also provide an alternative means for
enforcing the socio-economic rights in the ICESCR if progress is made on the
proposed Optional Protocol related to individual complaints. U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report of the open-ended working
group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an optional protocol to the
[ICESCR] on its first session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4I2004144 (Mar. 15, 2004); see
Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability Of Economic, Social, And
Cultural Rights: Should There Be An International Complaints Mechanism To
Adjudicate The Rights To Food, Water, Housing, And Health?, 98 Am. J. Int'l L.
462 (2004).
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made justiciable social rights a reality in South Africa and
international constitutional jurisprudence.

In

